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Frames in the U.S. Print Media Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict
Durga Ray
ABSTRACT

This study examined the frames used by the U.S. print media – The New York
Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times – in their coverage of the
Kashmir conflict and the parties involved in it from 1989 to 2003. It divided the 15-year
period of coverage into four phases – 1989-1990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001, and 2002-2003
– and focused on the coverage of seven subjects. It then identified sources and keywords
from 180 news reports and placed them into categories from which it isolated thematic
clusters or frames.
The study found that in the first two phases, the conflict was described as a
violent Kashmiri separatist movement, a frame that changed to one depicting it as
ongoing violent conflict between India and Pakistan. In all phases, Kashmiris were
predominantly identified as armed militants fighting for secession of Kashmir from India,
a goal that decreased in prominence in the last two phases. India was depicted initially as
a country suppressing the rebellion in Kashmir through violent means with the help of its
armed forces, a frame that shifted later to a military force fighting Pakistani troops and
non-Kashmiri Islamic fighters. Pakistan was consistently identified as a country
supporting the Kashmiri separatist movement with arms and training, and later as a
v

country itself participating in the conflict through its military. The United States was
consistently described as a country concerned with peace and security in South Asia. The
dominant frames in all periods were found to be portraying the conflict as a war and in
the last two phases, a potential nuclear war. The Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris were
always characterized through their religious identities – Indians as Hindu, and Pakistanis
and Kashmiris as Muslim or Islamic. Official sources were consistently greater in number
than unofficial sources for India, Pakistan and the United States but for Kashmiris,
unofficial sources scored over official ones in all four periods.
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Chapter One
Introduction

The mass media have been shown to have a significant impact on what issues the
public thinks about and how it thinks about them. Two of these effects of the mass media
are embodied in the theories of agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and framing
(Gamson, 1989; Goffman, 1974; Graber, 1988; Entman, 1989; Tuchman, 1978)
respectively. In the works of the above experts on it and many of the other researchers
who have investigated it, framing has been advanced as a theory that applies to the
different stages of the mass communications process – message formation, transmission,
and assimilation.
Past research in international mass communication has shown the media are very
influential in setting the public agenda with regard to foreign nations. Indeed, for the
American public, not only are the media the chief sources of information about foreign
affairs, prestige newspapers such as The New York Times, The Washington Post and the
Los Angeles Times are also sources of information for foreign policy elites, including
government officials (Graber, 1980). In a survey of 629 randomly selected residents of
Dade County, Florida, Salwen and Matera (1992) found a distinct agenda-setting
influence of the news media regarding perceptions about foreign countries. Their results
1

indicated evidence in the form of changes in public assessments of foreign nations as
dangerous places in relation to media coverage of those nations. The public also provided
an accurate assessment of the relative frequency of coverage given to each country in the
U.S. media. Since the media are the major sources of information about foreign nations
for U.S. audiences, it can be argued that the specific information contained in media
messages (frames) are also transferred to people, so that they have a media-induced
problem definition, sense of moral responsibility, and treatment recommendation for
whatever is happening in a particular foreign country. It is this ability of the media
through their use of frames to tell people how to think about something that makes the
study of frames very important.
Kashmir has been a flashpoint in relations between India and Pakistan since their
independence from British rule in 1947. In the past 56 years, the two nuclear-capable
countries have fought four wars, three of which have centered on Kashmir. As recently as
the summer of 2002, the two nations were almost on the brink of war and had amassed
millions of troops on their mutual border after an attack by a group of gunmen from the
Kashmiri separatist group Lashkar-e-Toiba on India’s Parliament Building on December
13, 2001.
This study will attempt to identify and analyze the terms that have been used by
the U.S. media to describe the conflict and the different parties to it – India, Pakistan, and
the people of Kashmir. It also will look at whether and how these frames have changed
over the years as the conflict has evolved and different actors have entered and exited the
scene. In addition, it will attempt to place the changes in the frames, if any, in the context
2

of changes occurring in the relationship between India and Pakistan, in global events and
in international equations.
Since international events are outside the direct experience of most people who
depend on the mass media for information on foreign affairs, it is important to determine
to what degree bias is reflected in news reporting because “legislators, as well as the
public, may form negative or positive stereotypes of a country based on media portrayal
that is disproportionate and distorted” (Dickson, 1992). In order to understand whether
the press revealed a bias for or against the U.S. government vis-à-vis the US-Sandinista
conflict in Nicaragua, Dickson analyzed the content of The New York Times and The
Washington Post articles between 1983 and 1987. The purpose of her analysis was to find
out the degree to which these papers relied on U.S. government officials rather than other
sources for information about the conflict. Results of the content analysis indicated that
both papers were heavily dependent on officials in Washington for information and an
overwhelming majority of stories about the conflict were put together by the papers’ staff
members in the United States, particularly in Washington, DC.
Several explanations have been offered for the disproportionate reliance of the
media on officialdom. According to Entman (1989), the media get most of their
information from officials because the “least expensive way to satisfy mass audiences is
to rely upon legitimate political elites for most information” due to the elites’ cultural
legitimacy and the “facts” they supply. The extent to which the media are dependent on
official sources can be gauged by the fact that the beat system in most media
organizations is organized along the lines of government bureaucracy. The enormity and
3

complexity of day-to-day events necessitate the establishment and practice of certain
routines in order to make it possible for media organizations to control the task of
reporting the news (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). Therefore, the established routines of
newsgathering, as well as the ease of availability and the perceived prestige and
objectivity of official sources, ensure the media’s dependence on them for information.
Thus, as the results of Dickson’s analysis point out, the media to a great extent legitimate
the prevailing government “line” (p. 569; emphasis in original).
Apart from organizational routines, the principle of objectivity that journalists
must observe while reporting on a multi-dimensional issue also ensures that certain
voices will get aired more than others. Since the practice of objectivity means journalists
have to interview legitimate elites on all major sides of a dispute, it is easy for those elites
who can improve their access and package their viewpoint in media-friendly terms, to
make sure that they gain favorable coverage (Entman, 1989; Noakes and Wilkins, 2002).
Since the nature and identity of the sources used is important to understand the manner in
which an event or issue has been covered, this study will look at the sources used by the
U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir to determine which voices and perspectives got
aired.

Justification for the Problem
It is important to understand how the U.S. media have covered the Kashmir
conflict by studying the frames they have used in this coverage for three reasons. First,
because in general the study of frames helps one to understand how the media construct
4

social reality, the study of these frames will help one understand how the U.S. media
have described, explained and interpreted the Kashmir conflict. Second, since foreign
news is the most obvious area where the media shape people’s perceptions of reality for
the reason that a vast majority of people have limited resources for acquiring and
interpreting information about events in foreign nations (Gamson, 1992), then this study
could serve as a starting point for the study of the impact of the frames used in coverage
of the conflict on the perception of the conflict itself and the parties engaged in it. Third,
by analyzing the coverage of Kashmir for the presence of frames as well as tracking the
changes in those frames over a 15-year period, this study will contribute to knowledge
about foreign news coverage of the U.S. media, particularly about an area of the world
that has until recently not been of much interest to U.S. policymakers and consequently
the media.

5

Chapter Two
Review of Literature

In order to understand the frames that have been used in the coverage of the
Kashmir conflict, one needs to acquaint oneself with the genesis and history of the
conflict as well as the nature and significance of media frames. This section provides a
brief account of the Kashmir issue in the context of relations between India and Pakistan
and also their relations with the international community, particularly the United States.
This chapter also discusses in some detail the concept of framing as a means of
organizing media text as well as the impact of frames on consumers of the media.

Overview of the Kashmir Dispute
The British left the Indian subcontinent in August 1947, but not before
supervising its division into two nations - India and Pakistan. The basis of partition was
religious – while India was a seen as a Hindu-majority state, Pakistan was envisioned by
its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, to be the home of the subcontinent’s Muslims.
Hindu-majority areas were designated parts of India while Muslim-majority areas were
parts of the new Pakistan. All provinces ruled by kings and princes were given a choice
of acceding into either nascent state. The region of Kashmir (or the current Indian state
6

called Jammu & Kashmir) was a Muslim-majority province ruled by a Hindu king who
procrastinated on the decision to join either India or Pakistan (Ganguly, 2001; Dixit,
2002).
In October 1947, a tribal group in the southwestern part of Kashmir rebelled
against the king and was provided support by the Pakistani army in the form of men and
materials. When the rebels moved to the outskirts of Srinagar, the capital of the region,
the king panicked and approached India for assistance. The Indian Prime Minister, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru, agreed to provide military assistance on the condition that the king
accede to India and the accession be approved by a popular leader and the people’s
representative, Sheikh Abdullah.
Once the above two conditions were met, the Indian Army was airlifted into
Kashmir. The two sides fought a bitter battle till the declaration of a United Nationssponsored ceasefire on January 1, 1949. By the time the war ended, the rebels supported
by the Pakistani Army had managed to capture a third of the territory of the former
princely state. The ceasefire line was declared the Line of Control (LoC) between the two
nations and it has remained as such till this day. India referred the matter in 1948 to the
United Nations Security Council, which passed several resolutions asking Kashmiri
rebels and Pakistani forces to withdraw and mandating a free and fair plebiscite to
determine the fate of Kashmir. Due to deep-rooted mistrust of each other, India and
Pakistan have never carried out the terms of the U.N. resolution. The area captured by the
rebels in the 1947 war is called “Azad” (Free) Kashmir by Pakistan and “Pakistanoccupied” Kashmir (PoK) by India. The area under Indian control is called the state of
7

Jammu & Kashmir by India and Indian-occupied Kashmir by Pakistan and Kashmiri
separatists (Schofield, 2003).
The dispute about whether Kashmir should be a part of India or Pakistan is tied to
the respective identities of the two nations. While on the one hand Pakistan contends that
Kashmir should legitimately be a part of its territory because the two-nation theory holds
that Muslim-majority regions be a part of Pakistan, India insists that it cannot allow any
part of its territory to be separated from it on the basis of religious affiliation because
India was founded to be a pluralistic and multi-religious nation (Dixit, 2002). Pakistan
has consistently demanded that India conduct the UN-mandated plebiscite, a demand that
India refuses to meet on the grounds that the plebiscite was on condition that Pakistan
withdraw completely from the region, which it has not done to date. India also asserts
that Kashmir is legitimately a part of its territory because the king chose to accede into
India after the partition. Another important reason why India refuses to let go of Kashmir
is because it fears this will set off a domino effect and provide support to other regions in
India that want to break off from the Indian union (Cohen, 2003).
In subsequent years, the Cold War between the then U.S.S.R. and the United
States shaped India-Pakistan relations. While Pakistan courted western powers by
advertising itself as a potential protector of Western interests in the oil-rich and
predominantly Muslim Middle East, India positioned itself as a non-aligned nation and
developed a close relationship with Russia (Ayoob, 1999). Pakistan was a major U.S. aid
recipient through the cold war years and was given substantial arms assistance by the
United States to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
8

(Tahir-Kheli, 1997). Along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Pakistan was a very important
partner in the U.S. effort to support Afghan resistance fighters to mount a “jihad” (holy
war) against the Soviet Union.
Tensions between India and Pakistan continued to simmer and reached a head
several times, resulting in three more wars after the 1947 war – one in 1965, when
Pakistan attacked India, believing it to be weakened by a humiliating defeat in the hands
of China in 1962; and another in 1971, when India was instrumental in helping what was
then East Pakistan to break away from Pakistan and become a separate nation –
Bangladesh (Ganguly, 2001). The third, albeit undeclared war was fought in 1999 in the
Kargil sector in the upper reaches of the Himalyas in Kashmir.
A decisive turn in the Kashmir dispute came in 1989, when Muslim extremists
started an armed separatist movement in the Kashmir valley (Dixit, 2002; Cohen, 2003).
Their objective was a Kashmir independent of both India and Pakistan. After the start of
the movement for self-rule, Hindus, who were a minority in the Kashmir valley, left their
homeland in hordes. As civilian massacres became an everyday occurrence, the state
government was dissolved and the Indian Army moved into the state to control the
situation. Throughout the 1990s, the Indian Army continued to battle militant groups in
Kashmir. India routinely accused Pakistan of supporting various terrorist groups in
Kashmir and repeatedly asked Pakistan to refrain from doing so. On the other hand,
Pakistan persistently accused India of denying Kashmiris the right to self-determination
and of committing human rights violations (Dixit, 2002). Matters were further
complicated and took a turn toward Islamic fundamentalism and “jihad” when the
9

Afghanistan war ended in a Russian defeat in 1989 and Afghani mercenary fighters
moved into Kashmir to support militant groups in the early 1990s.
Another turning point in India-Pakistan relations and in Kashmir as the
subcontinent’s flashpoint came when both countries tested their nuclear devices in May
1998. Defying pressure from the western powers to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), which stipulated a ban on nuclear testing, India tested five nuclear
devices on May 11 and May 13, 1998 (McHorney, 2002). Alarmed at India’s actions,
Pakistan also conducted underground nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. As a punitive
measure, the U.S administration headed by President Bill Clinton imposed economic
sanctions against India and Pakistan, limiting U.S. economic aid as well as trade and
military transfers to both countries.
The nuclearization of the subcontinent raised the profile of the Kashmir issue in
the international arena, as western powers became increasingly alarmed at the possibility
of border skirmishes escalating into a nuclear war between the two countries,
notwithstanding India’s offer of no first use of nuclear weapons. Ironically, according to
New Delhi and Islamabad, overt acquisition of nuclear weapons had significantly reduced
the likelihood of war between them (Ganguly, 2001).
The first post-nuclear-tests war between India and Pakistan was fought in and
around Kargil in the upper reaches of the western Himalayas in the summer of 1999.
Taking advantage of inadequate patrolling of this very harsh and inhospitable terrain, the
Pakistani Army and Kashmiri insurgents had infiltrated across the LoC in the spring of
1999, taking the Indian Army by surprise. India conducted air strikes against the
10

intruders, who had a strategic advantage over ground troops as they had firmly
entrenched themselves in high-altitude positions. The Clinton administration, in marked
contrast to its policy of mediating regional disputes, refused to support Pakistan’s attempt
to bring the issue into the United Nations Security Council. This stance was also a
departure from the traditionally pro-Pakistani U.S. policy, and finally forced Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to order a withdrawal from Kargil on July 4, 1999
(Ganguly, 2001; Dixit, 2002).
The decade of the nineties saw the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the
United States as the world’s sole superpower. Indo-US relations improved, with
increased bilateral trade and the emergence of India as a hub for information technology.
Clinton’s refusal to mediate in the Kargil crisis and his subsequent visit to India in 2000
marked a positive shift in relations between the United States and India. Taking
cognizance of India’s assertion that Pakistan was sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir,
Clinton, in a public broadcast in Pakistan during his 2000 visit, warned Pakistan of
potential international isolation if the nation did not change its course.
The events of September 11, 2001 and the U.S. war against terrorism changed all
that and brought Pakistan back to center stage in the triangular relationship. While India
courted the United States enthusiastically – a marked departure from its previous policy
towards the country – the U.S. chose to partner with Pakistan in its attempt to uproot the
Taliban from Afghanistan (Mohan, 2002). Pakistan’s location and the Pakistani Army’s
intimate knowledge of the Taliban no doubt played a decisive role in the US decision to
ask Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf for support.
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Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in
New York City have made the U.S. administration more sympathetic to India’s terrorist
concerns. The administration’s new pro-India attitude was reflected in its response to the
spate of terrorist attacks in India after September 11, notably the attack on the Indian
Parliament on December 13, 2001. In response to this attack, India mounted a massive
military deployment, cut off transportation links with Pakistan, downgraded diplomatic
ties with Pakistan, and threatened to go to war against Pakistan (Schaffer, 2002). The
George Bush administration quickly intervened and for the first time formally
acknowledged the link between Kashmiri terrorist groups and the Pakistani state. This act
pressured Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf to declare that Pakistani soil
would not be used to export terror to any part of the world and resulted in formal
commitments from Pakistan to end cross-border infiltration into India. He kept his
promise and in January 2002 banned the Lashkar-e-toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad,
two Islamic jihadi outfits that had been involved in the attack on the Indian Parliament
(www.rediff.com).
At present, there is a debate in academic circles as to whether the United States
should help India and Pakistan work out a permanent solution to the dispute over
Kashmir, going beyond its traditional role of episodic crisis management. Some argue
that the moment is opportune, with India-U.S. relations improving considerably (Mohan,
2002) and the growing realization in the United States that in order to check global
terrorism, failing states such as Pakistan need to be addressed on a long-term basis
(Schaffer 2002). Others, however, argue that U.S. mediation in Kashmir is a distant
12

possibility because the region is of little interest to the United States for several reasons
(Limaye, 2002, p164). The dispute is largely unfamiliar to most Americans and Kashmir
contains no resources that are of interest to the U.S. and its allies. Also, resolution of the
conflict does not involve any ideological values dear to the United States. Although
preventing nuclear war has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy towards South Asia in the
past decade, the region still remains a low-priority area for U.S. diplomats.

Framing
A major and fairly recent part of media effects research, framing theory is used to
explain the power of a communicating text. Framing by the mass media is an essential
part of their role in the construction of social reality (Tuchman, 1978). The news media
have the power to shape the meanings that the audience assigns to an issue or event
because they “disseminate the information that people want, need, and should know” (p.
2). In this way, the media actively promote the frames of reference that readers and
viewers use to interpret and discuss public events and problems. McCombs, Shaw and
Weaver (1997) have equated framing with second-level agenda setting, which is transfer
of issue attributes from the media to the public. They argue that framing is an extension
of agenda setting in terms of media effects. The mass media have been shown to have on
the public, a powerful agenda setting influence whereby the priority assigned by the
media to certain issues gets translated into the priority assigned to them by the consumers
of these mass media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). While agenda setting describes the
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power of the media to tell people “what” to think about, framing can be regarded as
telling them “how” to think about it.
Framing can be defined as the selection of some attributes of a given event or
issue and the presentation of them as more prominent than other attributes or aspects of
the event or issue in the media. According to Entman (1993), “to frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52; emphasis in original). According
to Gitlin (1980), the origin of frames lies in the media’s selection of certain versions of
reality over others. “Day by day, normal organizational procedures define “the story,”
identify the protagonists and the issues, and suggest appropriate attitudes toward them”
(p. 4; emphases in original). Since this research is limited to the print media, it will
discuss only frames that are embedded in print news texts.
Frames have four locations – the communicator, the text, the audience and the
culture – and on any given issue, frames from different locations might be different from
each other (Entman, 1993). The communicators (journalists) have certain ways in which
they cover each event and these are dictated by news values, routines of news coverage –
deadline pressures, preferred use of certain types of sources over others, and
organizational ideology – and their own personal values (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991;
Tuchman, 1978). These factors contribute to them looking at events in a certain manner;
this gets translated intentionally or otherwise into frames in the text that they write
(Gamson, 1989).
14

The presence of frames in a text can be gauged by looking for the use of “certain
keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that
provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (p. 52; Entman, 1993).
These frames are transferred to the readers, who interpret them according to their mental
schemata, defined as mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing
of information (Graber, 1988). In the words of Lippman (1922), “the only feeling that
anyone can have about an event that he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his
mental image of that event” (p.13). Although each member of the audience has unique
mental schemata, frames can be regarded as having a common effect on the majority, if
not all, of the people subjected to them. This common effect on readers is what makes it
important to study the frames used by the mass media.
The fourth location for frames is the culture, which can be regarded as a
storehouse of values, beliefs and practices that inform both the communicator and the
audience. The frames embedded in popular culture assume special significance in
international communication because journalists reporting on a foreign nation are bound
to frame their messages in a manner that is compatible with the audience and cultural
frames in their home country. According to Graber (1980), American correspondents
abroad must operate within the context of current American politics and the current
American culture and their stories “must not only reflect the American value structure,
but also conform to established American stereotypes.” For example, Noakes and
Wilkins (2002) contend that US media coverage of the first Palestinian intifada (popular
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uprising against Israel in 1987), was sympathetic to the Palestinians’ cause because the
claims of the intifada resonated with Western social movement frames.
Entman (1993) has said that the frame in a text is an imprint of power. Several
powerful groups compete to get their frames included in the reporting of an event or issue
and therefore a communicating text conveys the frame of the group that won the battle to
dominate it. According to Lippman (1922), since major issues are very complicated and
subject to several different choices and opinions, “it is natural that everyone should wish
to make his or her own choice of facts for the newspapers to print” (p. 345). An obvious
example of this tussle for ensuring that one’s interpretation of an issue is the dominant
perception about it, is the one that goes on between interest groups on either side of a
debate.
Andsager (2000) studied the comparative success of pro-life and pro-choice
groups in dominating media discourse on policymaking on late-term abortion in 1996
through their use of rhetoric. She found that although pro-choice groups had more press
releases than pro-life ones, the rhetorical terms used by pro-life groups appeared in the
media twice as frequently as those used by pro-choice groups. Andsager posited that this
could be because the pro-life rhetoric “fit-in with journalists’ attitude towards late-term
abortion, which most people found grisly, as well as the traditional newsworthiness value
of conflict” (Andsager, 200; p. 589). It is apparent from her study that the rhetoric
employed by competing groups has an impact on journalistic framing.

16

Framing Effects
The salience of a frame in a media text is a product of the interaction of the
frames embedded in the text and in the mental schemas of the reader. Although the
presence of frames in a text, as detected by researchers, does not guarantee that audience
frames will be identical to the frames in the text (Entman, 1989), media frames, by
emphasizing some aspects of a problem over others, activate certain kinds of knowledge
within people, and this in turn affects their trains of thought and recommended behavior.
According to Price, Tewksbury and Powers (1997), media frames have two kinds of
effects on the audience – applicability effects and accessibility effects. During processing
of a media text, the salient attributes of the text activate in readers’ minds certain ideas
that affect their response to the message. These are called applicability effects. Once
activated, these ideas and feelings remain in the readers’ minds and are used in making
subsequent evaluations. These are defined as accessibility effects.
Price et al (1997) conducted an experiment in which undergraduate students were
asked to read articles about possible cuts in state funding. They manipulated an article to
reflect three different dominant frames – a conflict frame, a human interest frame, and a
consequence frame. They also used a fourth group as control, subjecting its members to a
story that just had the bare bones of the proposed budget cut. In the posttest
questionnaire, respondents were asked to write down all thoughts and feelings they had
while reading the stories randomly assigned to them. Coding of the open-ended answers
revealed a significant difference in the responses of the groups subjected to different
frames.
17

To study the long-term effects of message framing on readers’ cognitive
responses, Tewksbury, Jones, Peske, Raymond and Vig (2000) conducted a two-wave
experiment where they asked undergraduate students in the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign, to read five experimentally manipulated versions of a news article
on proposed state regulation of large-scale hog farms. One of the articles was an
objective version of the issues surrounding hog farms with equal emphasis on the
environmental impact of unregulated hog farms and the economic impact of regulating
them. Two articles moderately emphasized the environmental and economic frames
respectively while the last two were extremely lopsided in each direction. The
respondents were asked to fill out a posttest questionnaire with specific questions gauging
their “feelings towards large-scale hog farms” and whether they thought large-scale hog
farms should be banned in the state of Illinois. They were also asked to summarize the
large-scale hog farm issue. Three weeks later, the subjects completed an identical test.
The results confirmed that subjects’ cognitions were affected by the relative
dominance of frames within the articles that they read. For example, the subjects in the
environmental frame were more likely to support regulation of large-scale hog farms. The
strength of the pattern was lower three weeks later but still present, reflecting the
persistence of frames. As the results of this experiment indicate, the different frames that
journalists use to report on an issue can significantly impact public thinking on that issue.
However, Tewksbury et al (2000) caution that such prominent effects may only be in
case of issues that are not very mainstream. Iyengar (1991) found that the relationship
between media frames and audience frames is strongly contingent upon the issue under
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study. For instance experimental manipulation of a highly salient issue like
unemployment did not have a significant impact on the respondents’ attribution of
responsibility for a problem. Since foreign news constitutes a very meager amount of
coverage in the U.S. media and the American public is highly ethnocentric (Graber, 1980,
it follows that the dispute over Kashmir is not a very salient issue for them and therefore
media frames would have a major impact on what they think about the issue. From the
above discussion, one can conclude that media frames do have an impact on audience
thinking about issues, particularly regarding non-salient ones.

Research Questions
In light of the literature cited above, it can be argued that it is important to
understand the frames that the U.S. media have used in the past and are using now in
their coverage of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan because those media
frames are the source of the mental frames about the issue for American people as well as
for American policymakers, albeit to a lesser extent. Drawing from Entman’s (1993)
perspective on frames, one can say that analyzing the media coverage for frames would
also yield information about the problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral
evaluations, and treatment recommendations that the U.S. media have been promoting for
the Kashmir crisis.
Gamson (1989) conceptualized that media discourse on any issue can be
conceived as a set of interpretive packages, with the frame as the central organizing idea
forming the core of each interpretive package. Frames are the tools that help the audience
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and even journalists in constructing meaning and making sense of relevant events, by
suggesting what is at issue. However, packages are not static. Media discourse on any
particular issue evolves as these packages change over time incorporating new events into
their interpretive frames.
In the 15-year time period chosen for this study, many changes occurred in the
nature of the dispute over Kashmir, in India-Pakistan relations, in the two countries’
relationships with the United States, as well as in the global climate. At the beginning of
the time period under analysis – 1989 – the Cold War was ending between the United
States and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the Afghanistan war between the occupying Soviet
troops and U.S.- and Pakistan-supported Afghan resistance fighters or “mujahideen”
ended in 1989 with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and an armed separatist movement
started in Kashmir. While the movement for self-rule in Kashmir evolved with Kashmiri
rebels seeing the advent of Afghani mujahideen in their ranks through the nineties, on the
global front, the Cold War came to an end and the focus of international relations shifted
towards nuclear containment. In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons
establishing their identity as nuclear-capable states and in the opinion of the world
Kashmir became a flashpoint that could trigger a nuclear war. In 1999, the two countries
fought the Kargil War, which ended in a ceasefire brought about by the Clinton
administration. The late 1990s also saw improved relations between India and the United
States.
The next major event that shook the world was the terrorist attack on the twin
towers in New York City on September 11, 2001, which fueled the Afghanistan war and
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ended in the rout of the Pakistan-supported Taliban. On December 13, 2001, an armed
jihadi group staged a suicide attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi killing 14
people, including the five attackers. In the summer of 2002, India and Pakistan mobilized
their troops along their border in Kashmir resulting in a massive standoff. The year 2003
saw a cooling down of tensions between India and Pakistan. This study attempts to track
the changes in U.S. media discourse on the Kashmir dispute in order to investigate
whether these events had an impact on the frames employed in its coverage. Therefore,
the first research question for the study is:
Have the frames in the U.S. print media coverage of the Kashmir
conflict changed in the 15-year period from January 1, 1989 to
December 31, 2003 and to what extent have these changes reflected
major developments in the region, in relations between India and
Pakistan, and in international affairs?
Since U.S. interest, threat to U.S. security and threat to world peace have been
found to be significant predictors of foreign news coverage by the U.S. media (Chang,
Shoemaker, and Brendlinger, 1987; Chang and Lee, 1992), an analysis of the frames in
the coverage on Kashmir would also show whether these concerns are also reflected on
how the issue is presented in the U.S. media. Exploring the frames in the coverage on
Kashmir would reveal whether the contextual statements made reflect the U.S.
government’s position on the issue as well as the country’s changing relationship with
India and Pakistan.
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Drawing from the above discussion, the second research question is:
What have been the dominant frames in the U.S. print media
coverage of the Kashmir conflict, and to what extent have these
frames reflected such major themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S.
national interest, threat to world peace, and so on.
The above literature review established the importance of sources – especially
official – in the reporting of events and issues. It was also suggested that media frames
carry the imprint of power because they are the outcome of the battle among sources
from different sides of a dispute to get their respective version of reality to be the one that
is most accepted. Frames are tools that help in the construction of reality and organize the
world into manageable chunks for the mass media audience (Tuchman, 1974; Gamson,
1989). Since making sense of the world requires effort, it follows that tools that are
prominently displayed and made cognitively readily accessible have a higher probability
of being used. Consequently, the sources that have the most access to the media because
they mold themselves to media requirements are more likely to ensure that their
interpretation becomes the dominant one.
This study will look at the sources used in the media text on the Kashmir conflict
to determine their origin and nature because these characteristics are important indicators
of the meanings that the media have chosen to attach to the issue. Last but not least,
knowledge of the sources used from both sides of the conflict and the relative emphasis
placed on them by the US media will inform the public relations and lobbying efforts of
the two countries.
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Therefore, the third research question is:
What are the nature and affiliation of the sources used by the U.S.
print media in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict?
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Chapter Three
Methodology

Frames are difficult to detect in news texts because many of the framing devices
used might appear as “natural” (Entman, 1991, p. 6; emphasis in original), unremarkable
choices of words and images. It is this nature of frames – to be present in a very
inconspicuous or “natural” fashion in the text – that makes them instrumental in
establishing a particular version of reality as the “common sense” (p. 6; emphasis in
original) or widespread interpretation of events. Both Entman (1991) and Gamson and
Modigliani (1989) contend that frames can be constructed from and are manifested in the
form of metaphors, keywords, concepts, symbols, visual images, exemplars, catchphrases
and depictions. In order to detect the frames used to describe the Kashmir conflict and the
actors involved, one therefore needs to identify these framing devices. Stripped down to
their grammatical basics, these devices are merely nouns and verbs, and their modifiers –
adjectives and adverbs. This method of analyzing parts of speech to detect frames used in
this research study is derived from the works of Entman (1989), Dyer, Miller and Boone
(1991) and Mills (1993).
Entman (1989) compared the U.S. media coverage given to the shooting of a
Korean Air Lines flight by Soviet fighter planes on September 1, 1983 that killed 269
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passengers and crew with the coverage given to the shooting of an Iran Air plane on July
3, 1988 that killed 290 people on board. In order to identify the frames, he looked for
specific words – nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs chosen to describe the victims, the
incident, and the act of shooting down of the planes. For example, some of the words that
described the victims were “innocent human beings,” “loved ones,” and “passengers;”
some words for the incident per se were “atrocity,” “murder,” and “massacre;” and some
words used to describe the shooting act were “barbaric/barbarous,” “deliberate(ly),” and
“murderous” (p. 19, p. 20). Similarly, in their analysis of the content of two wire services
one year before and one year after the Exxon Valdez crisis in March 1988, Dyer et al
(1991) identified three kinds of issues pertaining to the event – legal, economic and
environmental. They selected terms – words or groups of words – that characterized each
issue “based on the extent to which it was felt those terms occurred in the data context
and represented the occurrence of the issue.” Some of the terms that categorized the issue
as legal were “litigation,” “trial,” and “arbitration;” some that fit under the economic
category were “profit,” “merger,” and “stock;” and finally, the environmental issue
category included terms like “wildlife,” “dispersants,” and “otter” (p. 31).
Mills (1993) looked at the frames employed in the coverage of the armed conflict
between U.S. agents and the members of the Branch Davidian cult led by David Koresh
in Waco, Texas in the spring of 1993 by The Washington Post and the St Petersburg
Times. He analyzed 213 stories from these two newspapers for keywords, phrases, or
literary devices “with particular attention being paid to nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs
and descriptive figures of speech in the texts and headlines” (p. 26). Mills identified
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“narrative elements in the text that were instrumental in adding (or subtracting) meaning
within the coverage. For example, any nouns used to identify or adjectives used to
describe cult members were coded, provided those nouns and adjectives added a sense of
meaning to the text.” (p. 26) Mills grouped words such as “standoff,” “fortified,” and
“violent” into a “Warfare” frame; words like “messiah,” “abusive,” and “apocalyptic”
into a “Religious fanaticism” frame; and words such as “disaster,” “death toll,” and
“tragedy” into a “Tragic victims” frame (p. 30). This study will follow the examples of
Entman, Dyer et al and Mills in its coding of the text of news reports on Kashmir from
January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 in The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times
and The Washington Post.
These three newspapers were chosen as the media to be examined because they
are “prestige” newspapers that enjoy widespread respect not only among the reading
public but also among elites, including policymakers (Graber, 1980). The New York
Times offers a comprehensive coverage of the Kashmir dispute during the time period
under study – 1989 to 2003. A Lexis Nexis headline search for “Kashmir” from January
1, 1989 to December 31, 2003 yielded a total of 188 articles from The New York Times
and 53 from The Washington Post while a similar search in the database, ABI Inform
Global, yielded 57 articles for the specified period in the Los Angeles Times. Since the
aim of this study is to examine the frames employed in the news coverage given to the
Kashmir conflict specifically by these newspapers, editorials, letters to the editor, and
wire reports were eliminated from the population. The articles were grouped under four
time periods because the distribution of stories in the 15-year-period under study was
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unequal, with some years having an overwhelmingly large number of stories and some
having none, particularly in the Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post.
The first time period included stories from The New York Times and The
Washington Post in the years 1989 and 1990. There were no articles on Kashmir in the
Los Angeles Times for these two years. The second period of study was 1991 to 1998, and
included 31 stories from The New York Times and three each from The Washington Post
and the Los Angeles Times. The third period was from 1999 to 2001, with a significant
jump in the number of stories from 1998 to 1999 in the Los Angeles Times (3 to 19) and
The New York Times (4 to 24). The fourth period was the two-year period from 2002 to
2003, because there was a second increase in coverage from 2001 to 2002 in all the three
newspapers under study: from 15 to 51 in The New York Times, 5 to 24 in the Los
Angeles Times and from 6 to 21 in The Washington Post.
In order to maintain a certain degree of parity with the years where there was no
coverage, a random sample was chosen from the years where the number of stories was
more than 10 in any of the newspapers. So since the number of articles in The New York
Times and The Washington Post were more than 10 in 1990, 33 and 13 respectively, a
random sample of 17 and 6 stories were chosen from the two newspapers respectively.
Table 1 shows the composition of the sample of news stories that were analyzed for this
study. In order to answer the first and second research questions which are how have the
frames in the coverage of the Kashmir dispute changed in the time period under study
and what have been the dominant frames, the selected articles were analyzed for the
frames used to describe the conflict, the region, and the three parties to it – Indians,
27

Pakistanis and Kashmiris. These articles were also analyzed to determine the sources
used in the coverage of the dispute. The unit of analysis was each word of interest in each
of the 180 articles.
Table 1: Distribution of Stories (1989-2003) in the Sample
Time period
1989-1990
Subtotal
1991-1998

Newspapers
The New York Times

No. of stories

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Post
Los Angeles Times

Subtotal
1999-2001
Subtotal
2001-2003

The New York Times
The Washington Post
Los Angeles Times
The New York Times
The Washington Post
Los Angeles Times

Subtotal
Total

23
7
30
33
3
3
39
25
6
17
48
33
13
17
63
180

The articles were coded for keywords, metaphors, descriptors and other such
framing devices by picking out the nouns and verbs and their modifiers – adjectives and
adverbs – that have been used to describe each of the following “subjects” – Kashmir as a
conflict per se; Kashmir and South Asia as a geographic region; Indians and India;
Pakistanis and Pakistan; Kashmiris and Kashmir; the United States; and “Other” parties.
Once these terms were identified, the author grouped them into thematic clusters or
frames in a manner similar to that of Entman (1989), Dyer et al (1991) and Mills (1993).
After identifying the frames on the basis of the keywords found and coded in the 180
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articles under study, the author made a list of the frames evident in each of the time
periods for each subject and then compared the frames evident in all four time phases for
all subjects for any patterns that emerge over the entire 15-year period studied. The
author assessed whether changes in the frames may be related to and explained by
placing them in the context of developments in the region and in the world at that time.
In order to answer the third research question, namely, what is the nature and
origin of the sources used by the U.S. media in the coverage of Kashmir, the articles were
coded for the sources used on the basis of two criteria: the first was their affiliation that is
whether they were Pakistani, Indian, Kashmiri, U.S or other; the second criterion was
their nature – official or unofficial. Sources from both Pakistan-occupied and Indianoccupied Kashmir were categorized as being Kashmiri. Government, military, political
and diplomatic sources were categorized as official, whereas representatives of militant
organizations, religious organizations, human rights organizations, academic and
professional research groups, laypersons and so on were categorized as unofficial
sources. Once the sources were coded on the basis of their nature and affiliation, the
author performed a frequency analysis on them to see the percentage of official versus
unofficial sources used as well as the percentages of Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri and U.S.
and other sources used in the 15-year time period.
In order to establish the reliability of the coding decisions, a random sample of
articles was chosen and coded by the author and two other coders who were both
University of South Florida graduate students, one in the Mass Communications track
and the other in the Journalism track. Both coders were in their fifth semester of study at
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USF and had knowledge of mass media theories and practices. For the purpose of
establishing the reliability, the author and the two coders coded the first article appearing
in all three newspapers in seven randomly chosen years from the 15-year period under
study. The total number of articles coded was 13 – seven from The New York Times and
three each from The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. There were no articles
in The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times for four of the randomly chosen
years. The author conducted a brief training session with the two other coders to explain
to them the conceptual and operational definitions of each of the categories mentioned
earlier. The intercoder reliability between each of the two coders and the author was
computed with the help of Holsti’s (1969) formula, which is:
Reliability =

2M
N1+N2

where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree and N1
and N2 are the total number of coding decisions taken by the two coders.
After establishing the intercoder reliability, the author proceeded to code all the
180 articles with the help of a coding sheet (see Appendix A), categorizing the words in
the news reports for each period according to their part of speech and “subject” they
described. The author also coded the sources according to the “subject” they represented
and also based on their nature – official or unofficial.
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Chapter Four
Results

Since the findings of this research study were very extensive, a detailed report of
the findings has been provided in this chapter while the specific conclusions that answer
the research questions as well as explanations, interpretations and implications of these
conclusions are included in the final chapter of this document.
Mass media frames are elements – words and groups of words – that are used by
journalists to describe, explain and interpret “subjects” for their audiences, which are
dependent on the media for information, especially about occurrences in foreign
countries. The “subjects” may be events, occurrences and issues, players involved in the
event, the thoughts, feelings and attitudes of the players, as well as the situations and
contexts of their occurrences. To delineate frames in the coverage of an event or issue,
one has to look at the words – keywords and modifiers – that describe the “subjects.” In
order to then identify the frames in the coverage of a particular “subject,” one needs to
identify the regularities in the keywords and modifiers used for it. One can then place the
keywords and/or modifiers that are similar in meaning in thematic groups or thematic
clusters or frames and develop names or labels for these frames. The process is somewhat
similar to the development of “factors” in the quantitative analysis of news coverage and
has been followed in the past by Entman (1989) in his analysis of the U.S. media
31

coverage of the KAL and Iran Air accidents, Dyer et al (1991) in their analysis of the
wire service coverage of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Mills (1993) in his analysis of
the shifting framework of the news coverage of the cult crisis in Waco, Texas.
In order to determine the changing frames used by the U.S. media in their
coverage of the Kashmir conflict and thus to answer the first research question, the author
followed a process similar to the one described above. First of all words – nouns, verbs,
adjectives and adverbs – used to refer to the 1) conflict, 2) the Kashmir region, 3) India
and Indians, 4) Pakistan and Pakistanis, 5) Kashmiris, 6) the United States and 7) other
players or actors, were drawn out from the news articles appearing in The New York
Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times in the 15-year period from 1989
to 2003. In order to determine whether the frames used in the coverage of these
“subjects” have changed over the past decade and a half, the coverage of the period was
divided into four phases: 1989-1990, 1991-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2003 on the basis
of the frequency of news articles appearing in these years. The number of articles in The
New York Times and The Washington Post dropped sharply from 1990 to 1991, but there
was a leap in coverage from 1998 to 1999. One again, the number of articles in each of
the three newspapers in 2002 and 2003 was significantly higher than in 2001.
After the isolation and coding of words, a count was done to determine the
frequency with which these words appeared in each phase of coverage. For each of the
seven subjects identified above, words that appeared with the highest frequency were
identified and grouped and expressions coined to capture the themes or frames among
words that seemed to form thematic groups. Depending on their relative prominence,
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frames were categorized as major and minor. The relative occurrence of these major and
minor frames in each period was then assessed and compared in order to answer the first
research question, which is whether the frames have changed in the 15 years of coverage
from 1989 to 2003. This established the basis for answering the second research question
which was of a more general nature and asked what have been the dominant frames in the
coverage of the Kashmir conflict. To answer the third research question, about the nature
– official or unofficial – and the affiliation – Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, U.S. and other –
the sources used in each story were coded according to these criteria. To determine the
relative frequency with which they were used, the number of times each source was used
within each story was also recorded.
However, prior to coding the 180 articles in the sample according to the
previously described method and to establish the credibility of the results generated from
the process, intercoder reliability was computed between the author and each of two other
coders for 13 randomly chosen articles from the three newspapers under study. The
results, which were computed with the help of Holsti’s formula (the acceptable level was
set at 0.80 by the author), are summarized in the table below.
Table 2: Intercoder Reliability Coefficients between Author and Two Coders
Author and

For sources

For keywords

Coder 1

0.97

0.86

Coder 2

0.90

0.91
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Frames for the conflict
Nouns that were synonymous with the events occurring in Kashmir from 1989 to
2003 – armed struggle for separation from India, suppression of the rebellion by India,
training and arming of Kashmiri militants by Pakistan, infiltration of foreign fighters
especially those from Afghanistan – were identified, and then grouped into thematic
clusters within each of the four previously identified phases. Adjectives that described
these events were also coded and then grouped in the same fashion. Table 3 provides a
summary of the major and minor frames in decreasing order of prominence as determined
by the frequency of usage of their constituent words vis-à-vis both nouns and modifiers
that were used to describe the conflict in the four periods of U.S. media coverage under
study.

1989-1990
In the first phase, in The Washington Post and The New York Times, there were a
total of 30 articles on the Kashmir conflict, with 44 words used 197 times to describe the
conflict per se. Of these words, the most commonly used descriptors for the conflict were
“war” (quoted 40 times), “movement” (19) and “violence” (18). Due to its dominance
over other words, “war” was defined as a frame in itself called “Warfare.” While
“movement” was classified as part of a Mass-based Action frame, the word “violence”
was cast into a Physical Violence frame. Both the latter two frames were minor frames
for this period. Since all the other words used to describe the events in Kashmir in the
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years 1989 and 1990 occurred far fewer times than the above three, those words were not
taken into account.
The most commonly occurring modifier for the Kashmir conflict was “separatist”
(12) followed by “independence” (7), “political” (5) and finally “anti-Indian” (4), all of
them describing the nature of the events in Kashmir as being motivated by the desire of
the Kashmiri people to break away from India. These modifiers form part of the Massbased Action frame that includes words like “movement” and “struggle” because they
indicate the motive for the campaign being conducted by the Kashmiri people.
In the first phase, the most commonly occurring verbs used for the conflict
convey the impression of an event that is expanding in scale. Words such as “escalated,”
“growing,” “worsened,” “has spread” and their synonyms appeared 10 times representing
a Growing Unrest frame.

1991-1998
In the second phase, 48 words were used 238 times to describe the conflict in a
total of 39 articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles
Times. The most prominent frame was once again Warfare with the word “war”
occurring 51 times, followed by “insurgency” (29), “conflict” (26), “violence” (16),
“rebellion” (14), and “dispute” (9). “Insurgency” and “rebellion” were grouped together
to form the Internal Revolt frame. In this eight-year period of coverage, only two major
frames emerge – the Warfare frame and the Internal Revolt frame.
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Although the modifiers signifying the Mass-based Action frame add up to a
higher figure (18), the most prominent single modifier in this phase is “guerrilla” (15),
which is a part of the Internal Revolt frame because while insurgency or rebellion is a
name for the action that is being done, guerrilla signifies the method by which it is
perpetrated. The modifier “nuclear” appears only 9 times in this period and can be
considered a minor frame named Nuclear Risk.
The frame for the conflict continued to be that of Growing Unrest, with words
such as “degenerated,” “has threatened,” and “erupted,” that appeared a total of 11 times.
Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict

Noun

Major Frames
1. Warfare

Modifiers

1. Mass-based
Action

Verbs

1. Growing Unrest

Noun

Major Frames
1. Warfare
2. Internal Revolt

Modifiers

3. Mass-based
Action

Verbs

Growing Unrest

1989-1990
Related Words Minor Frames
War
1. Mass-based
Action
2. Physical
violence
separatist
independence
political
anti-Indian
escalated
worsened
growing
1991-1998
Related Words Minor Frames
War
1. Conflict
insurgency
2. Physical
Violence
rebellion
1. Nuclear Risk
independence
separatist
secessionist
independence
degenerated
erupted
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Related Words
movement
violence

Related Words
conflict
violence
nuclear

Table 3: Frames for the Kashmir Conflict (continued)

Noun

Modifiers

Verbs

Noun

Major Frames
1. Physical
Violence
2. Warfare
3. Conflict
1. Long and
Dangerous Conflict

Growing Unrest

Major Frames
1. Warfare
2. Outside
Interference
3. Physical
Violence

4. Conflict

5. Disagreement

Modifiers

Verbs

1. Long and
Dangerous Conflict
2. Outside
Interference
Growing Unrest

1999-2001
Related Words
fighting
violence
battle
War
conflict
decade-old
large-scale
long-running
dangerous
protracted

has raged
could escalate
2002-2003
Related Words
war
infiltration
incursion
violence
fighting
killings
Jihad
battle
conflict
tensions
standoff
crisis
dispute
issue
large-scale
widespread
cross-border

continued
intensified
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Minor Frames
1. Terrorism

Related Words
terrorism

1. Internal Revolt

insurgency

1. Nuclear Risk
2. Mass-based
Action
3. Outside
Interference
4. Religious
Identity

nuclear
freedom
independence
Pakistan-backed
Pakistan-based
Islamic
Muslim

Minor Frames
1. Mass-based
Action

Related Words
struggle
movement
campaign

1. Nuclear Risk

nuclear

2. Mass-based
Action
3. Internal revolt
Stabilizing Unrest

separatist
guerrilla
has calmed
calming

1999-2001
In the third phase of the period under study, there were 48 articles from all the
three newspapers under study. The most commonly occurring word for the events in
Kashmir was again “war” (75 times) signifying a Warfare frame, which was very closely
rivaled by “conflict” (70) forming a frame called “Conflict,” and “fighting” (67) which
was grouped with “violence” (26) to form a frame called “Physical Violence” because
both words signify physical acts of violence with no necessary ideological dimension.
The Physical Violence frame was discovered to be the dominant frame for this period,
even overtaking the Warfare frame
The modifiers describing the intensity and possible extent of the Kashmir conflict
– labeled the Long and Dangerous Conflict frame – occurred a total of 43 times with
words such as “decade-old,” “large-scale,” “long-running,” “dangerous,” “protracted”
and “wider.” This frame had a greater prominence than other frames such as Nuclear
Risk comprising the word “nuclear” (16), Mass-based Action made up of words like
“freedom” and “independence” (13), and Religious Identity signified by use of modifiers
such as “Islamic/Muslim” (10). The other frame that emerged through the modifiers for
this phase were what was referred to as the Outside Interference frame (10) that
included adjectives such as “Pakistan-backed” and “cross-border,” indicating
involvement of parties other than Indians and the Kashmiris in the conflict.
Continuing the trend observed in the first two phases, Growing Unrest
comprising words such as “could escalate,” “has raged,” and “could deepen,” with a total
of 15 uses, persists as the dominant frame in the third period as well.
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2002-2003
In the fourth period, although once again “war” (108 occurrences) emerged as the
most commonly occurring descriptor of the Kashmir conflict, two new words to dominate
coverage were “infiltration” and “incursion.” These two words were considered part of
the Outside Interference frame (99) that occurred for the first time in the previous
phase. These words convey the perception that the conflict playing out in Kashmir was
being actively supported and/or conducted by people outside the region. A close third
was the Physical Violence frame with “violence” occurring 41 times, “fighting”
occurring 18 times, “killings,” 14 times, “jihad,” 12 times and “battle,” 8 times.
The fourth prominent frame was the Conflict frame, formed from the words
“conflict” (30), “tensions” (29) and “standoff’ (13), which together occurred 72 times in
the last two years of the time period under study. All these three words signify a
protracted tussle over something between two or more parties that are unwilling to
change their positions on the issue. A third frame was constructed by grouping together
words such as “dispute” (30), “issue” (20) and “crisis” (11), which implied that there was
a disagreement that had become a cause of contention between two or more parties
which, in this case, are India, Pakistan and the local Kashmiris. This frame was labeled as
the Disagreement frame.
The Disagreement frame (51), formed by words such as “crisis” (27), “dispute”
(17) and “issue” (7), was the fifth dominant frame in 2002-2003. “Struggle,” (17),
“movement” (9), and “campaign” (7) constituted a minor frame called the Mass-based
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Action because all these three words signify a broad-based activity aimed at changing the
status quo.
The most commonly occurring frame for modifiers was once again that of a Long
and Dangerous Conflict (35) – comprising words like “all-out,” “escalating,” and “fullblown” – followed by the Outside Interference frame constituted by the adjective
“cross-border” (17). The Nuclear Risk frame, the Mass-based Action frame exemplified
by the word “separatist,” and the Internal Revolt frame represented by the word
“guerrilla,” were the minor frames for this period.
There were two types of descriptions for the intensity and direction of the conflict
in this phase with Growing Unrest (20) still as the most prominent frame composed of
words like “continued,” “intensified,” and “has escalated.” However, verbs such as
“calming,” or “has calmed,” or “scaling back,” which were grouped into the Stabilizing
Unrest frame (15), also appear in this phase signifying a move towards a decrease in the
intensity of the conflict in this phase.

Frames for the Region
The second category of “subjects” for which frames were identified in the 15-year
coverage was the region of Kashmir, a land that lies in the extreme north end of India and
Pakistan. About two-thirds of the region, which has a distinct history and a tradition of
religious tolerance, lies within India, while Pakistan controls almost one-third. The
remaining stretches to the north east are controlled by China. The state of Jammu and
Kashmir is an Indian administrative unit, with Jammu as the winter capital of the state
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and the city of Srinagar, which is in the Kashmir valley, the summer capital. Although
there are linguistic and cultural similarities between Kashmir and Jammu, while Kashmir
is a Muslim majority area, Jammu has a majority of Hindus.

1989-1990
In the first phase, 12 words for the region occurred 54 times, and the most
commonly occurring word was “state” (18 times), signifying an identification of the
region as a Political Entity that is part of a larger nation. The second frequent description
was “valley” (11 times), which portrays the Kashmir region as a Geographical Entity.
The most commonly occurring modifiers for the region in this period were those that
described Kashmir as a region where the majority of the population followed the Islamic
faith. Modifiers such as “Muslim-dominated,” “predominantly Muslim,” and “Muslim
majority,” were grouped to form the “Religious Identity” frame that appears 20 out of a
total of 45 times in this period.

1991-1998
In the second period, out of 74 times, Kashmir was described 25 times as a
“territory,” 19 times as a “region” and 14 times and as a “state,” implying that it was
more likely to be described as a Geographic Entity than as a Political Entity in this
period. Continuing the trend of describing Kashmir as a Muslim region, modifiers that
represent the Religious Identity frame occur a total of 21 times in this period followed
by “disputed” that is repeated 16 times and fits into the Disagreement frame.
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Table 4: Frames for the Kashmir region

Noun

Modifiers

Noun

Modifiers

Noun
Modifiers

Major Frames
1. Political Entity
2. Geographic
Entity
1. Religious
Identity

Modifiers

valley

2. Disagreement

Muslim-dominated
predominantly
Muslim
Muslim majority
1991-1998
Constituent words
territory
region
state
Muslim-dominated
predominantly
Muslim
Muslim majority
disputed

Major Frames

1999-2001
Constituent words

1. Geographic
Entity
1. Disagreement

region
territory
disputed

2. Religious
Identity

Muslim
Muslim-dominated
2002-2003
Constituent words

Minor Frames

region
territory
disputed
Muslim

1. Political
Entity
1. Geographic
Entity

Major Frames
1. Geographic
Entity
2. Political Entity
1. Religious
Identity

Major Frames
Noun

1989-1990
Constituent words
state

1. Geographic
Entity
1. Disagreement
2. Religious
Identity
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Minor Frames
1. Political
Entity
1. Geographical
Entity

Constituent
words
state
Himalayan
mountainous

Constituent
words
state
Himalayan
beautiful
rugged

1999-2001
The third phase did not show much change in the identification of Kashmir as a
Geographic Entity, except that in this period “region” occurred more frequently (32
times) than “territory” (22 times). The Political Entity frame was a distant third with the
word “state” appearing only 8 out of 98 times as a descriptor for Kashmir. In this period,
the Disagreement frame comprising the word “disputed,” (33) surpassed the Religious
Identity frame with 21 occurrences of modifiers describing the Kashmir region.
Descriptions that fit into the Geographic Entity frame such as “Himalayan” and
“mountainous” occur 16 times, reinforcing the identification of Kashmir as a piece of
land.

2002-2003
In the last phase of coverage, Kashmir continues to be described as a Geographic
Entity – as a “region” (41 times) and as a “territory” (19 times) – but its description as a
“state” (18 times), although less frequent than region or territory, is noteworthy because it
shows a gradual movement towards describing Kashmir once again as a Political Entity.
With the modifiers, the region continues to be described in terms of the Disagreement
frame – “disputed” (38) followed by the Religious Identity frame – “Muslim” (27), and
finally through the Geographic Entity frame – “Himalayan,” “rugged,” and “beautiful”
for a total of 16 times.
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Frames for India and Indians
The third “subject” for which words were identified and grouped under thematic
clusters was India or Indians. In 1989, Jammu and Kashmir was and still is a state in the
Indian union, although Pakistan controls a significant amount of its territory. It is
important to look at the frames used for India because it is a major player in the Kashmir
conflict and because the insurgency in Kashmir is being waged in order to sever the
region from India and either establish it as an independent nation or integrate it into
Pakistan. In the last 15 years, India has refused to let go of the region, despite heavy
civilian and military casualties, allegations of human rights violations, constant efforts by
Pakistan to get India to negotiate and even an undeclared war fought with Pakistan on the
snowy Kargil heights.

1989-1990
In this period, the most commonly occurring frame for India was the Military
Establishment frame formed by combining “troops” (51 times), “army” (18 times),
“security forces” (12 times) and “soldiers” (10 times). The second widely used frame
included “government” (52 times), “leaders” (8) and “officials” (14), which were
grouped with “government” to form a “Civilian Establishment” frame for describing
India. India was described using 29 modifiers that were quoted 216 times. India is
described as a “Hindu” country 20 times, signifying the prevalence of the Religious
Identity frame in this period. The frame includes modifiers such as “Hindu,” “Hindu
dominated,” and “predominantly Hindu.”
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There were two major frames for the description of the actions of Indians in
Kashmir – one was that of a Violently Repressor and the other was that of a Law and
Order Maintainer. The first frame, made up of words like “killed,” “burned,” “shoot,”
“fired” and their synonyms (51 occurrences), had a higher prevalence as compared to the
second one, which was made up of words like “sealed off,” “arrested,” “to guard,” and
“patrolling,” with 42 occurrences.

1991-1998
In this period, 53 words were used 389 times to refer to India in a total of 39
articles. As in the last period, the Military Establishment frame, constituted by the
words “troops” (85), “army” (39), “security forces” (30), “soldiers” (23) and ‘forces”
(13), dominated the Civilian Establishment frame, comprising the words “government”
(65), “officials” (31) and “leaders” (9). Continuing the use of the Religious Identity
frame, India is described as a “Hindu nation” (29) in the second phase of the period under
study. Other modifiers that reflect the Military Establishment frame for India are
“military/paramilitary” used 21 times to describe Indian troops in Kashmir.
While the two frames that emerged in the first phase continue to be present in the
second one, this period shows a much higher dominance of the Violent Repressor frame,
composed of words such as “shot,” “raped,” “tortured,” and “assaulted” (a total of 71
occurrences) as compared to the Law and Order Maintainer frame, which included
words like “banned,” “monitored,” and “sealed off” (a total of 30 occurrences). The third
frame that emerges in this period is identification of India as a Diplomatic Entity,
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reacting to the events in Kashmir and putting forth its opinion and judgments on the
issues involved. This frame was constructed from words such as “accused,” “claimed,”
“insisting,” and “refused,” which together were used 67 times.
Table 5: Frames for India and Indians

Noun
Modifiers
Verbs

Noun
Modifiers

Verbs

Noun
Modifiers

Verbs

1989-1990
Major Frames
Constituent Words
1. Military Establishment troops, army, security forces, soldiers
2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders
1. Religious Identity
Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly
Hindu
1. Violent Repressor
killed, burned, looted
2. Law and Order
Sealed off, arrested, to guard, patrolling
Maintainer
1991-1998
Major Frames
Constituent words
1. Military Establishment troops, army, security forces, soldiers, forces
2. Civilian Establishment government, officials, leaders
3. Religious Identity
Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly
Hindu
2. Military Establishment military, paramilitary
1. Violent Repressor
2. Law and Order
Maintainer
3. Diplomatic Entity

shot, raped, killed, tortured, assaulted
banned, monitored

accused, claimed, insisting
1999-2001
Major Frames
Constituent words
1. Military Establishment soldiers, troops, army, forces, security forces
2. Civilian Establishment leaders, government, officials, power
1. Religious Identity
Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly
Hindu
2. Nuclear Risk
nuclear, nuclear-armed
1. Conciliatory Posturing defused, urged, claimed, agreed
2. Aggressive Posturing
blamed, refused, accused, denied
3. Continuing Warfare
have been fighting, shelling, battling
4. Violent Repressor
killed, shot, fired
5. Law and Order
imposed, arrested, impounded
Maintainer
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Table 4: Frames for India and Indians (continued)
2002-2003
Major Frames
1. Military Establishment

Noun

Modifiers

Verbs

2. Civilian Establishment
1. Nuclear Risk
2. Religious Identity
1. Aggressive Posturing
2. Conciliatory Posturing
3. Continuing Warfare
4. Violent Repressor
5. Law and Order
Maintainer

Constituent words
troops, soldiers, security forces, army,
military
government, leaders, officials
nuclear, nuclear-armed
Hindu, Hindu dominated, predominantly
Hindu
glared, rejected, have refused, have ruled out
agrees, cut back, welcomed
are fighting, are waging, mobilized, massing
killed, shot dead, attacked
patrolled, policed, monitors

1999-2001
The Military Establishment frame (117) was slightly more prevalent in this
period of news coverage – and was revealed by the naming of Indians as “soldiers” (45
times), “troops” (27), “army” (22), ‘forces” (14) and “security forces” (9) – than the
Civilian Establishment frame (113), which was constituted by words such as “leaders”
(43 times), “government” (40 times), “officials” (17 times) and “power” (13 times). A
total of 47 descriptors for India were used 304 times in this period of coverage. The most
common adjectives used to describe India in this period remained the ones that form the
Religious Identity frame (20), followed for the first time by the use of “nuclear” to
describe India. The words “nuclear” and “nuclear-armed” occur 19 times and can be
grouped under the Nuclear Risk frame.
In this phase, the Diplomatic Entity frame was split to reflect the nature of the
actions being done by Indians. Words describing positive and neutral actions, for
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example, “claimed,” “defused,” “urged,” “contends,” “agreed,” and “allowed” (68
occurrences), were grouped into the Conciliatory Posturing frame, whereas words that
convey a defensive and confrontational stance or a refusal to move away from one’s
entrenched position, such as “denied,” “accused,” “refused,” and “blamed” (52
occurrences), were grouped into an Aggressive Posturing frame. Although the Law and
Order Maintainer frame (21 usages) as well as the Violent Repressor frame (25
usages) continued to be present in this period in the words used to describe the actions of
the Indian government, both were less prominent than the two frames describing the
diplomatic functions of the Indian government. Another frame to emerge in this period
was that of Continuing Warfare that is exemplified by usage of words like “shelling,”
“have been waging,” “battling,” and “fought” (used 32 times) that conveyed the
impression that India was engaged in a protracted battle or fight with the Kashmiris and
the Pakistanis.

2002-2003
In what has been a trend that has remained consistent throughout the 15-year
period under study, the Military Establishment frame for Indians was more prominent
than the Civilian Establishment frame in this period to the extent that the former (182)
occurred nearly twice the number of times for the latter (92). For the former frame, the
most frequently used word was “troops” (43 times), followed by “soldiers” (41 times),
“security forces” (33 times), ‘army” (21 times and “military” (9 times). For the second
frame, “government” occurred 40 times but “leaders” was used 21 times and “officials”
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31 times. For the first time in the 15-year period under study, among the modifiers, the
Religious Identity frame vis-à-vis adjectives for India takes second position to the
Nuclear Risk frame, with the words describing India as a Hindu country occurring 19
times but those identifying it as a nuclear power occurring 37 times.
The most prominent frame to emerge in this period for Indians is that of
Aggressive Posturing, comprising words such as “glaring,” “asserted,” “demanded,”
“have ruled out,” “have refused,” and “rejected” that have 102 occurrences. The second
major frame is that of Conciliatory Posturing, made up of words like “agrees,”
“claimed,” “cut back,” “welcomed,” “has accepted,” “hoped,” “offered,” and “pulled
back” that occurred a grand total of 63 times. Compared to the prominence of these two
frames, the other three frames for India in this period – Continuing Warfare (38), Law
and Order Maintainer (24) and Violent Repressor (24) – can be regarded as minor
frames.

Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis
Another major party in the Kashmir dispute is Pakistan, India’s neighbor to the
west and a nation founded in 1947 on the principle that South Asian Muslims needed a
land of their own separate from India, where majority of the population is of the Hindu
faith, although the country is a secular democracy where every citizen has the equal right
to practice his or her faith. Since its creation, Pakistan has asserted that Kashmir belongs
to it for the reason Kashmir is a Muslim majority province and Pakistan is an Islamic
nation. Although founded as a democracy, Pakistan has been ruled by its military for
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most of its 57-year existence as a nation. A democracy under Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto when the armed rebellion in Kashmir started in 1989 and later ruled by the
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan was taken over in a coup in
October 1999 by then Pakistani Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf who declared
himself the Chief Executive Officer of Pakistan.

1989-1990
In the first phase of coverage, 19 words were used 53 times to describe Pakistan,
compared to 216 times for Indians and 283 times for Kashmiris. Of the 19 words, the
most commonly occurring was the word “government” (12 times), “officials” (6 times),
and “leaders” (6 times), indicating that the Civilian Establishment frame was dominant
over the Military Establishment frame composed of the words “army” (6 times) and
“troops” (4 times). As with the modifiers used for India, Pakistan was also described as a
“mostly Muslim,” and “Islamic” nation, reflecting the use of the Religious Identity
frame (8 out of a total of 16).
Although the Pakistanis had a low profile in this period as compared to the
Indians and Kashmiris, a couple of frames emerged for Pakistanis as well. A slightly
higher prevalence was of the Active Supporter frame, which was made up of verbs such
as “supported,” “armed,” “training,” and “helping,” with a total of 19 usages that
conveyed the fact that Pakistan was providing finance, training and arms to the
Kashmiris. The second frame was of a Diplomatic Entity and was composed of verbs
like “charged,” “denied,” “accuses,” and “challenging,” a total of 17 occurrences.
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1991-1998
In the second phase, the Civilian Establishment frame (30) was three times more
visible than the Military Establishment frame (10), with “government” occurring 11
times, “officials” 6 times, “villagers” 8 times and “civilians” 5 times. “Troops” (7) and
“army” (3) were the third most commonly occurring words for Pakistanis, who had a
total of 26 descriptors for this phase that were used 67 times. Continuing the use of the
Religious Identity frame, in this phase also, Pakistan continues to be described as a
“Muslim” country (8) and as a “nuclear” power (3) out of a total of 17 times.

1999-2001
The Civilian Establishment continues to dominate references to Pakistanis in the
coverage in the third period as well. The most commonly occurring word for Pakistanis
in this phase is “leader(s)” occurring 56 times. The word “general,” used as a reference to
General Pervez Musharraf, who took over power in Pakistan in October 1999 by
overthrowing the popularly-elected government, appears 27 times. “Officials” (13) and
ruler (9), again a reference to General Musharraf, are also part of the bigger Civilian
Establishment frame which is constituted of a total of 137 references. The second most
important frame used to name Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (119) with
“soldiers” occurring 42 times, “troops” 34 times, “forces” 15 times, “army” 12 times and
“military” 16 times. The total number of descriptors for Pakistan in the third phase was
67. These 67 descriptors were utilized a total of 419 times, 115 more than those for
Indians and 194 more than those for Kashmiris.
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The most commonly used modifiers for Pakistan for this period again fit into the
Religious Identity frame (39), and included words such as “holy,” “religious,” “Muslimdominated,” and “Muslim majority.” The second frame that is evident in the modifiers
for Pakistan is the Military Establishment frame (31), with the use of the words “army”
and “military” to describe Pakistanis. For the first time, one can see the occurrence of the
Outside Interference frame here as exemplified by the modifiers “Pakistan-based,” and
“Pakistan-supported” that occur 15 times. Other modifiers that occur, albeit to a lesser
extent, are “militant” (8) and “terrorist” (7).
Demonstrating the growing Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir conflict from
1999, the number of verbs for Pakistanis is this phase is 462, as compared to 378 for
Indians and only 101 for Kashmiris. The most evident frame for Pakistanis in this phase
was that of Conciliatory Posturing, formed by words that convey positive or neutral
actions and gestures, such as “suggested,” “proposed,” “acknowledged,” and “claims,”
used 105 times. The second major frame was that of Violent Neighbor, formed by words
like “fired,” “shot,” “”shelling,” and “fought,” that occurred 76 times. The next major
frame was the Active Supporter of Kashmiris frame, with 58 occurrences of related
words, including for the first time words describing the movement of Kashmiri and other
extremist fighters from Pakistan to India across their border that is referred to as the Line
of Control. The last major frame was that of Aggressive Posturing, conveyed by words
like “charged,” “accuses,” and “demanded,” used 43 times.
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2002-2003
The Military Establishment frame (84) takes over from the Civilian
Establishment frame (62) as the dominant one for describing Pakistan in the fourth and
final phase of coverage. The total number of words used to describe Pakistanis in the
final phase was 69 and these words were used 397 times. “Troops” appeared 28 times,
“forces,” 19 times, “army,” 18 times, “military,” 12 times and “soldiers,” 7 times forming
the Military Establishment frame. Part of the Civilian Establishment frame,
“Government” appeared 37 times while “leader(s)” was used 25 times. However, a close
rival to the Military Establishment frame and one that surpasses the Civilian
Establishment frame is a new frame composed of words such as “militants” (53),
“jihadis” (14), “fighters” (5), “extremists” (6) and “guerrillas” (4). These words form a
group called the Militant Extremists frame (82).
Among modifiers, the three most common frames in decreasing order of
prominence are Religious Identity, with the words Islamic or Muslim (44); Nuclear
Risk, with the words “nuclear,” “nuclear-armed,” “nuclear-capable;” and finally, the
Militant Extremists frame, with the modifiers “militant” appearing 22 times and
“extremist” 10 times. This compliments the presence of the same frame in the nouns used
to describe Pakistan.
The most prominent verb frame for the Pakistanis in this period was that of
Conciliatory Posturing, as evident through the use of words for positive and neutral
actions such as “promised,” “admitted,” “eased,” “has pledged,” “to improve,” and “to
resolve” (106 occurrences). The second most prominent frame was a new one called
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Cracking Down, which was constructed from words that expressed the Pakistani
Government’s actions in this phase aimed at curbing the activities of Islamic extremist
organizations like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others. This
frame was composed of verbs like “to end,” “cracked down,” “banned,” “has reined in,”
“have closed,” “shut down,” and “stopped” (95 occurrences). The third prominent frame
was that of Aggressive Posturing, made of “denied,” “demanded,” “facing off,”
“rejected” (71 times) – followed by that of Active Supporter made of “arming,”
“training,” “backing”(61 times) – and finally, that of Violent Neighbor – “fired,”
“killed,” “mobilizing,” “opened fire,” “to bleed,” and “waging” ( 44 times).
Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis

Major Frame
Noun

Modifiers
Verbs

1. Civilian
Establishment
2. Military
Establishment
1. Religious
Identity
1. Active
Supporter
2. Diplomatic
Entity

1989-1990
Constituent
words
government
officials
leaders
Army
troops
mostly Muslim
Islamic
training
helping
arming
charged
denied
accuses
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Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued)
Major frame
Noun

1. Civilian
Establishment

Modifiers

1. Religious
Identity

Verbs

1. Active
Supporter
2. Diplomatic
Entity
3. Violent
Neighbor

Major Frames
Noun

1. Civilian
Establishment

2. Military
Establishment

Modifiers

1. Religious
Identity

Verbs

1. Conciliatory
Posturing
2. Violent
Neighbor
3. Active
Supporter

1991-1998
Constituent
words
government
officials
villagers
civilians
Muslim
predominantly
Muslim
providing
supporting
harboring
claimed
denied
demanded
bombarded
fought
shelled
1999-2001
Constituent
words
leader(s)
general
officials
ruler
soldiers
troops
military
army
Muslim
Islamic
holy
suggested
proposed
fired
shot
shelled
helping
arming
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Minor frames
1. Military
Establishment

Constituent
words
troops
army

1. Nuclear Risk

nuclear
nucleararmed

Minor Frames

Constituent
words

1. Outside
Interference

Pakistanbased
Pakistansupported
Demanded
charges
accused
refused

1. Aggressive
Posturing

Table 6: Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis (continued)

Noun

Modifiers

Verbs

2002-2003
Major Frames
Constituent
words
1. Military
troops
Establishment
forces
army
military
soldiers
2. Militant
militants
Extremists
Jihadis
fighters
extremists
guerrillas
3. Civilian
government
Establishment
leader(s)
1. Religious
Islamic
Identity
Muslim
2. Nuclear Risk
nuclear
nuclear-armed
3. Militant
militant
Extremists
extremist
1. Conciliatory
promised
Posturing
admitted
has pledged
2. Cracking Down banned
rein in
to end
stop
3. Aggressive
facing off
Posturing
demanded
blamed

Minor Frames

Constituent
words

1. Active
Supporter

training
backing
arming
fired
waging
mobilizing
opened fire

2. Violent
neighbor

Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris
The Kashmiris have always regarded themselves as entitled to a special status
within the Indian union and have expressed nationalistic aspirations since 1947, when
Kashmir became a part of India (Schofield, 2003). In the decades of the 1950s, 1960s,
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1970s and 1980s, the Government of India eroded Kashmir’s special status through
Constitutional amendments, a trend that bred resentment among Kashmiris who were also
disillusioned by the corrupt and inefficient state administrations, lack of civic amenities
and rising unemployment. To add insult to injury, the state legislative body elections in
1987 were rigged by the party in power at that time in New Delhi, further angering
Kashmiris who finally took to the streets in 1989 and 1990. There were almost daily mass
demonstrations by thousands of people on the streets of Srinagar and other Kashmiri
towns, and militant organizations of Kashmiri youth took up arms in order to separate
Kashmir from India through violent means such as kidnappings and shootings.
Table 7: Frames for Kashmir or Kashmiris

Major Frames
Noun

1.Armed
Combatant
2.Ordinary
Kashmiris

Modifiers

Verbs

1. Religious
Identity
2. Mass-based
Action
1. Violent
Protester
2. Non-violent
Protester

1989-1990
Constituent
words
militants

civilians
residents
demonstrators
mourners
Muslim
mostly Muslim
separatist
pro-independence
bombed
kidnapped
shot
demonstrated
demanded
protested
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Minor frames
1.Organized
Activity
2. Separatist
Rebels

Constituent
words
groups
leaders
organization(s)
separatists
insurgents

Table 7: Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris (continued)
Major Frames
Noun

1.Armed
Combatant
2. Separatist
Rebels

Modifiers

Verbs

3. Organized
Activity
1. Religious
Identity
2. Internal
Revolt
1. Violent
Protester
2. Non-violent
Protester

Major Frames
Noun

Modifiers

Verbs

1. Organized
Activity
2. Armed
Combatant

1. Mass-based
Action
2. Religious
Identity
1. Violent
Protester
2. Non-violent
Protester

1991-1998
Constituent
words
militants
guerrillas
fighters
separatists
rebels
insurgents
groups
leaders
Muslim
Muslim majority
guerrilla
militant
killed
assassinated
fired
claimed
are boycotting
condemned
1999-2001
Constituent
words
groups
organization(s)
militants
guerrillas
fighters
separatist
freedom
anti-India
Islamic
Muslim
ambushed
gunned down
attacked
to wrench
argued
defying
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Minor frames
1. Ordinary
Kashmiris

Constituent
words
civilians

2. Religious
Identity

Muslims
Hindus

1. Mass-based
Action

separatist
rebel
proindependence

Minor frames
1. Ordinary
Kashmiris
2. Separatist
Rebels
3. Religious
Identity

1. Internal
Revolt

Constituent
words
civilians
insurgents
rebels
Muslims
Hindus

militant
guerrilla

Table 7: Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris (continued)
Major Frames
Noun

1. Armed
Combatant
2. Civilian
Establishment

Modifiers

3. Ordinary
Kashmiris
1. Religious
Identity
2. Civilian
Establishment
1. Violent
Protester

Verbs

2. Non-violent
Protester

2002-2003
Constituent
words
militant
guerrillas
fighters
government
candidates
leaders
civilians
voters
Islamic
Muslim
political
newly-elected
coalition
slaughtered
terrorized
massacred
seeking
espoused
calling for

Minor frames

Constituent
words

1. Internal
Revolt
2. Mass-based
Action

militant

1. Continuing
Warfare

are fighting
are battling
are staging

separatist

1989-1990
In the first two years of coverage, the number of times 48 nouns were used for
Kashmiris was 283, more than the count for Indians (210) and far above the count for
Pakistanis (53). The most commonly used word for Kashmiris in this phase was
“militants” (84) which was put into an Armed Combatant frame. A distant second was
the word “separatist” which was used 27 times and slotted into a minor frame called the
Separatist Rebels frame. Words such as “civilians,” “residents,” “demonstrators,”
“mourners,” “mobs” appeared a total of 40 times, forming a cluster called the Ordinary
Kashmiris. Also noteworthy were words like “groups” (17), “leaders” (16) and
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“organization” (3) that reflected an element of organization to the armed rebellion started
by the Kashmiris in 1989. These were put into a minor frame called Organized Activity
(36). The most common frame formed by the modifiers used to describe the Kashmiris in
this phase is the Religious Identity frame (33), comprising words such as “Muslim” and
“mostly Muslim,” followed by the Mass-based Action frame, comprising the modifiers
“separatist” (16) and “pro-independence” (7).
By grouping the verbs used to state the actions of the people of Kashmir in this
period, two frames emerged. One was that of Non-violent Protester and the other was
that of Violent Protester. The Non-violent Protester frame was constructed from words
like “demonstrated,” “protested,” “demanded,” “defying,” “complained” and other such
words with 41 occurrences that conveyed the apparent dissatisfaction of the people of
Kashmiris with the current state of affairs and their desire to bring about a change. The
second frame conveyed the parallel militant stream of the Kashmiri separatist/freedom
movement, and included words like “bombed,” “kidnapped,” “shot,” and “assassinated”
that occurred a total of 27 times.

1991-1998
In the second phase, 55 words were quoted a total of 421 times in describing
Kashmiris. The most commonly occurring word was once again “militants” (70) which
was grouped with “guerrillas” (47) and “fighters” (5) into the Armed Combatant frame
(122). The second thematic cluster, called Separatist Rebels (72) in the second phase of
media coverage, is composed of the words “rebels” (39), “separatists” (21) and
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“insurgents” (12). The third frame that was evident in the period from 1991 to 1998 was
the Organized Activity frame (56) that included the words “groups” (34) and “leaders”
(22). The Ordinary Kashmiris frame was also present, albeit to a lesser extent, with a
total of 47 occurrences, the most commonly occurring word being “civilians” (23 times).
Another minor frame that bears mention in this phase is the Religious Identity frame
(41) with the people of Kashmir being described as Muslims 26 times and Hindus 15
times.
Of the 201 times that modifiers were used to describe Kashmiris in this phase, the
highest frequency was of the words that are part of the Religious Identity frame (80),
composed mainly of the word “Muslim” (56), and also by the word “Hindu” that
indicates reference to Kashmir’s religious minority – Hindu Brahmins called Pandits,
who fled Kashmir in hordes after the armed insurgency started in 1989. The second
prominent frame formed by the modifiers used to describe the Kashmir and Kashmiris
was the Internal Revolt frame, composed of the modifiers “guerrilla” (19) and “militant”
(17) and signifying the manner in which the insurgency was conducted by armed groups
in Kashmir. Mass-based Action, the third important frame in this period, included the
modifiers “separatist” (20), “rebel” (8) and “pro-independence” (2).
Non-violent Protester and Violent Protester continued to be the two frames for
the Kashmiris in this phase as well, with the latter still dominating over the former. While
the Violent Protester was made up of words such as “torched,” “ambushed,” “attacked,”
“detonated,” and “gunned down,” (with 60 occurrences), the Non-violent Protester frame
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included words like “have demanded,” “condemned,” “to wrench,” and “are boycotting,”
with a total of 39 usages.

1999-2001
The Organized Activity and the Armed Combatant frames occurred with the
same frequency in the third phase. Words like “militants” (26), “guerrillas” (15) and
“fighters” (15) formed the Armed Combatant frame, while words such as “groups” (28),
“leaders” (22) and “organizations” (6) formed the Organized Activity frame. The third
frame that occurred to half the extent of the first two ones and therefore was a minor
frame was the Ordinary Kashmiris frame (24), with the word “civilians” again
occurring with the highest frequency. Another minor frame in this period was the
Separatist Rebel frame (22), with the word “insurgents” occurring 11 times and the
word “rebels” occurring 10 times. The Religious Identity frame (14) emerged as the
third minor frame in this period, with 10 occurrences of the word “Muslims” and 4 of the
word “Hindus.” The total number of descriptors for Kashmiris in this phase was 45 and
the number of timed they were used was 225.
In this phase, the modifiers can be grouped into two almost equally prominent
frames – the Mass-based Action frame (33), which includes words such as “separatist,”
“freedom,” and “anti-India;” and the Religious Identity frame (32), with words such as
“Islamic” and “Muslim.” A third but minor frame that appears in this phase is the
Internal Revolt frame (23) that includes the adjectives “militant” and “guerrilla” for
describing individuals and groups carrying out the armed movement in Kashmir.
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The verbs used for Kashmiris in this period can be grouped into the same two
frames that were present in the first two phases. The more prominent frame is once again
that of Violent Protester, with words like “raided,” “shot,” and “fighting” used 33 times,
followed by that of the Non-violent Protester, with words such as “argued,”
“demanding,” “defying” and “disagree” appearing 19 times.

2002-2003
In the fourth and final phase, 83 descriptors for Kashmiris were used a total of
563 times, with the Armed Combatant frame (168) emerging as the strongest in this
period. Within this frame, “militant” occurred 123 times; “guerrillas,” 25 times;
“fighters,” 11 times; and “militias,” 9 times. Although much weaker than the Armed
Combatant frame, the second powerful frame in this phase was the Civilian
Establishment frame (82), with “government” occurring 31 times; “candidates,” 20
times; “party,” 19 times; and “leaders,” 12 times. The Ordinary Kashmiris frame came
in third in the this phase, with 59 occurrences dominated by the word “civilians” (28)
followed by the word “voters” (10).
The most common modifier frame for this period is again the Religious Identity
(57) frame, formed by the religious modifiers used to describe Kashmir and Kashmiris,
such as “Islamic” (37), and “Muslim” (18). Complementing the surfacing of this frame in
the nouns used to describe Kashmiris, the second most prominent frame among modifiers
for this phase is the Civilian Establishment frame (32), formed by adjectives such as
“political,” “newly-elected,” and “coalition.” The Internal Revolt frame, exemplified by
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the adjective “militant” (31), is a minor frame for this phase of the period under study.
The other minor frame for this period is the Mass-based Action frame, represented by
the word “separatist,” which appears 22 times.
Continuing the trend set in the three previous phases, Kashmir and its people
continue to be described as Violent Protesters, who have “shot,” “killed,” “slaughtered,”
“terrorized,” and “massacred” (88 occurrences) people, including thousands of Indian
security forces, security personnel and Kashmiri civilians. The second major frame to
emerge was that of Non-violent Protester, indicated specifically by words like “calling
for,” “demonstrated,” “espoused,” “seeking,” and “opposed” (54 usages). There were two
minor frames in this period, with the more prominent among them being Continuing
Warfare that was conveyed through the use of words like “have been waging,” “are
fighting,” “are battling,” and “staging” (33 occurrences) that give the impression that the
people of Kashmir have been involved in a long, violent campaign to achieve an end. The
final minor frame is that of Violent Outsiders that is conveyed through the use of words
like “cross into,” and “infiltrated.”

Frames for the United States
Although South Asia has not traditionally been a region of high U.S. interest,
Pakistan was allied with the United States in the Cold War era and provided crucial
assistance to America in its fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan waged through
the local mujhahideen (Islamic warriors). The testing of nuclear weapons by both India
and Pakistan in May 1998 caused U.S. attention to be focused on the region and
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particularly on Kashmir which had been a traditional flashpoint between India and
Pakistan.
For all the periods under study, the most commonly occurring descriptors for the
United States were “administration,” “government,” “officials,” and “diplomats,” all of
which fit into the Civilian Establishment frame for the United States in all four phases.
There were no significant modifiers for the United States in the entire 15-year period.
The United States came across as a Concerned Advisor through the usage of words like
“urged,” “warned,” “are worried,” and “alarmed” (12 usages) in the first phase (19891990). Concerned Advisor was the frame that surfaced in the second phase (1991-1998)
from the analysis of the verbs such as “appealing,” “to ease,” “has encouraged,” and “to
settle” used for Americans (15 occurrences).
The role of the United States in the third phase (1999-2001) of the 15-year period
of media coverage under study exceeds that of even the Kashmiris regarding verbs. While
96 verbs were used for Kashmiris in this phase, the number was 125 for Americans. The
frame of Concerned Advisor still dominates usage with verbs like “called for,”
“assured,” “suggested,” “urged,” “agreed,” and “underscore” (68 occurrences). However,
there is an undercurrent of firmness in the verbs used for Americans in this phase that
was captured in words such as “asserted,” “pressured,” “rejecting,” “to impose,”
“warned,” used a total of 21 times and labeled the Assertive Advisor frame. In the fourth
phase (2002-2003), the United States once again came across overwhelmingly as a
Concerned Advisor “urging,” “assuaging,” “mediating,” (76 occurrences) between India
and Pakistan. Other words for Americans in this phase include “to defuse,” ‘to persuade,”
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“discussed,” “called on,” and “offered,” all fitting into the Concerned Advisor frame and
signifying the role of a nation playing a pacifist role.

Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict
All the actors in the Kashmir conflict that were not Indians, Pakistanis, Kashmiris
or Americans, were placed in this category.
1989-1990
Of the total occurrence of words for other parties (23), the descriptor “reporters”
occurred 7 times followed by “journalists” at 6 times and “news organizations,” 2 times
making the News Media the most commonly occurring other actor on the scene. There
were no significant modifiers in this phase of media coverage. No significant frames
emerged from the verbs used for the other parties involved in Kashmir in this phase of the
coverage.
Table 8: Frames for Other Parties in the Kashmir conflict
Major Frames
Noun

1. News Media

Major Frames
Noun
Modifiers
Verbs

1. Human
Rights Concerns
1. Human
Rights Concerns
1. Concerned
Advisor
2. Critical
Observer

1989-1990
Constituent
words
reporters
journalists
1991-1998
Constituent
words
groups
human rights
suggested
urged
denounced
criticized
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Table 8: Frames for other parties in the Kashmir conflict (continued)
Major Frames
Noun

1. Foreign
Soldiers

Modifiers

1. Religious
Identity
2. Outside
Interference
1. Violent
Outsiders

Verbs

Major Frames
Noun

1. Foreign
Soldiers
1. Concerned
Advisor

1999-2001
Constituent
words
guerrillas
fighters
militants
forces
mujahideen

Minor Frames
1. Separatist
Rebel
2. Outside
Interference

1. Separatist
Islamic
Rebel
Muslim
holy
Pakistan-based
pro-Pakistan
hijacked
shot down
2002-2003
Constituent
Minor Frames
words
guerrillas
militants
fighters
lauded
warned
reassured

Constituent
words
insurgents
rebels
separatists
infiltrators
invaders
freedom
pro-Kashmir
separatist

Constituent
words

1991-1998
A total of 20 words were used 74 times to refer to other parties, with the
descriptors “groups” at 15, “tourists” at 14, “hostages” at 10, and “Afghans” at 8, the last
one referring to the mujahideen from Afghanistan who came to Kashmir after the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Complementing the occurrence of
groups as the most prominent noun was the use of “human rights” as the most commonly
occurring modifier (16) implying that most of the outside actors in the conflict were
international human rights organizations. Thus, the frame Human Rights Concerns
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emerged from the analysis of descriptors and modifiers used to describe other players
involved in the Kashmir conflict.
Although the other players in this phase were also mainly cast in the role of a
Concerned Advisor conveyed by words such as “suggested” and “urged,” (10 usages),
another frame that emerged was that of a Critical Observer exemplified by words like
“denounced,” “criticized,” and “investigate,” used 8 times.

1999-2001
Indicating the growing participation of outside elements in the Kashmir conflict in
this phase, 31 words were used 193 times as descriptors for other actors on the scene. The
overwhelmingly occurring thematic group or frame was the Foreign Soldiers frame
(134) which included words like “guerrillas” (35), “fighters” (25), “militants” (24),
“forces” (15), “hijackers” (15), “mujahideen” (12) and “warriors” (8). Two minor frames
to emerge from this phase were the Separatist Rebel frame (13) with the words
“insurgents” (7), “rebels” (3), and “separatists” (3). The second minor frame was the
Outside Interference frame (10) including the words “infiltrators” (6), “intruders” (3)
and “invaders” (1).
The most frequently occurring modifiers in this period are religious ones (40
times) – for example, “Islamic,” “Muslim” and “holy” — providing evidence of the
existence of the Religious Identity frame. Modifiers such as “Pakistan-based,” and “proPakistan,” constitute the Outside Interference frame (15) formed by the nouns that were
used to identify the other players in this period. Complementing the Separatist Rebel
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frame formed by the nouns in the preceding paragraphs are modifiers like “freedom” (5)
“pro-Kashmir” (4) and “separatist” (2). Other modifiers used for others in this phase are
“militant” (5), “guerrilla” (4), and “terrorist” (3) which were not grouped into any frames
due to their low frequency of occurrence.
The verbs that were used for describing the actions of other parties in this phase
of the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir conflict were grouped into a Violent
Outsiders frame that includes words describing acts of physical violence perpetrated by
people other than Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri or American such as “fighting,” “hijacked,”
“shot down,” and “threatened,” used a grand total of 22 times.

2002-2003
Out of a total of 15 words used 43 times to describe the other players, the highest
numbers were again for the Foreign Soldiers frame (16) including “guerrillas” (6),
“militants” (5) and “fighters” (5). “Terrorists” and “tourists” were the other two words
that were mentioned four times each. There were no prominent modifiers for this phase.
The other players on the scene have been mainly characterized as Concerned
Advisors through words like “lauded,” “alarmed,” “reassured,” “urged,” “suggested,”
“recognize” and “pressuring,” with these and related words being used 29 times.

Sources Used to Cover the Kashmir Conflict
In answer to the third research question, which was what were the nature and
affiliation of the sources used by the U.S. media in their coverage of the Kashmir
69

conflict, the study found that all three newspapers – The New York Times, The
Washington Post and the Los Angles Times – used both official and unofficial sources,
but the relative distribution of official versus unofficial sources for each party to the
conflict, namely Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris – as well as the external parties – the
U.S. and other agents – was different in each period. The results of the analyses of the
inter-party and intra-party distribution of sources have been grouped below according to
the four previously identified phases of the coverage given to the Kashmir conflict. For
each period and each party, the total number of sources, both official and unofficial, was
determined.

Sources used from 1989-1990
The total number of sources quoted by The New York Times and The Washington
Post in this two-year period was 111. Of these, 45 or 40 percent were affiliated with
India, 33 or 29 percent with Kashmir, 14 or 12 percent with the U.S., 13 or 11 percent
with Pakistan, and finally, 6 or 5 percent with other players or groups. Table 8 illustrates
the sources used in this phase of media coverage.
Indian sources
Of the 45 Indian sources, 34 or 75 percent were official and were quoted a total of
50 times, while 11 or 25 percent were unofficial and quoted 13 times. The most
commonly quoted official sources were “officials” (7), “spokespersons” (7) and
“ministers” (6) of the Indian Government (24) or the Civilian Establishment. Part of the
Prime Minister’s cabinet, ministers are elected representatives of the people and are in70

charge of different portfolios such as Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Travel and
Tourism, and Civil Aviation. Another important official Indian source was the Governor
of the Jammu and Kashmir state (13), who in each state in the Indian union is the
representative of the central or federal government in New Delhi. After the insurgency in
Kashmir started to take a violent turn, the elected local government was dissolved by the
New Delhi government, which subsequently sent its representative – the Governor – to
rule the state. Government-controlled media or State Media constitute the third
frequently used official source while the Indian media not controlled by the Indian
government or Private Media feature as the top unofficial source quoted 10 times.
Pakistani sources
Of the 13 Pakistani sources, 12 were official while only 1 was unofficial. Official
sources were quoted 21 times, with the Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment
quoted 12 times followed by the Pakistani Army or Military Establishment quoted 10
times.
Kashmiri Sources
Out of the 33 Kashmiri sources used in 1989-1990 by the three newspapers under
study, 12 or 36 percent were official whereas 21 or 63 percent were unofficial. Local
Government, constituted by the Jammu and Kashmir Police (10) who are a statecontrolled unit of the elected government of Jammu and Kashmir (9), was the most
commonly quoted official source. Of the unofficial sources quoted 29 times, Average
Citizens were quoted 16 times, followed by former officials (4), local media (3),
separatist leaders (3) and religious leaders (3).
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Table 9: Distribution of Sources in 1989-1990
Affiliation
India

Pakistan

Kashmir

U.S.

Official
1. Civilian
Government
• officials
• spokespersons
• ministers
• Governor –
Jammu and
Kashmir state
2.State Media
1. Civilian
Establishment
• officials
2. The Military
• Pakistani
Army
1.Local Government
• Police
• state
government
1. Civilian
Establishment
• Administration
officials
• government
officials
2. Military
Establishment
• The Pentagon
1. Diplomats

Other
Total

No.
Unofficial
34 1. Private Media
2. Experts

12 1. Private Media

12 1. Average Citizens
2. former officials
3. local media
4. separatist leaders
5. religious leaders
10 1. Private Media

1 1. Private Media
2. Experts
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No.
Total %
11
45
40

1

13

12

21

33

30

4

14

13

5

6

5

42

111

100

U.S. Sources
The United States was represented by 10 official sources quoted 25 times, with
officials from the U.S. Government (7), the U.S. Administration (10) and the House
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Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia (3) being quoted the most making the
Civilian Establishment the major official source. The Military Establishment,
represented by the Pentagon, was quoted 4 times. Of the unofficial sources, other U.S.
media mainly the Associated Press or Private Media were quoted 5 times out of a total
of 6.
Other Sources
There was only one official source – diplomats quoted 2 times – and 5 unofficial
sources quoted 7 times. Other media and experts were quoted 3 times each.

Sources used from 1991-1998
The total number of sources used in this period in 39 stories was 171 of which 43 percent
or 74 sources were affiliated with India, a little more than 10 percent or 18 belonging to
Pakistani, 24 percent or 41 Kashmiri, 18 percent or 21 from the United States and 10
percent or 17 others. The distribution of sources on the basis of their affiliation is
demonstrated in the table below.
Indian sources
Of 74 Indian sources, 63 were officials quoted a total of 99 times. The Civilian
Establishment or officials from the Indian Government were quoted most frequently (35
times) followed by sources from the Military Establishment (21 times). The Jammu and
Kashmir Governor at 12 times was the third most frequently quoted source but was
considered part of the Civilian Establishment. Unofficial sources from India were only 11
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and quoted 14 times, with the Indian media (Private Media) quoted 6 times and Indian
Experts, 7 times.
Pakistani Sources
There were only 11 Pakistani official sources – all representatives of the Pakistani
Government – with most of the quotes from ministers (7), officials (6) and envoys (2)
constituting the Civilian Establishment. All Pakistani unofficial sources were Average
Citizens, most likely people living in the Pakistani side of Kashmir.
Kashmiri Sources
The number of unofficial Kashmiri sources (32) heavily dominated the number of official
sources (9). Of the unofficial sources which were quoted for a total of 62 times, Average
Citizens again emerged as the most commonly quoted sources (32), followed by
separatist leaders (19), and religious leaders (6). Official sources, who were quoted a
mere 10 times in the entire eight-year period, were part of the Local Government. The
Jammu and Kashmir Police was quoted 5 times, followed by the Jammu and Kashmir
government at 3 times.
U.S. Sources
Unofficial sources from the United States (12) were more numerous and quoted a
greater number of times (37) than official sources (9) quoted 19 times. Human Rights
Groups emerge as the most frequently cited American sources, followed by the U.S.
media (Private Media), 5 times, and experts, 5 times. The Civilian Establishment,
comprising U.S. Government officials (11), followed by the State Department (4) and
diplomats (2), was the only official U.S. source of information.
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Table 10: Distribution of Sources in 1991-1998
Affiliation
India

Pakistan

Kashmir

U.S.

Other

Total

Official
No.
Unofficial
No.
Total %
63 1. Private Media
11
74
44
1. Civilian
2. Experts
Establishment
• officials
• ministers
• spokespersons
• Governor –
Jammu and
Kashmir state
2. Military
Establishment
1. Civilian
11 1. Average
7
18
10
Establishment
Citizens
• ministers
• officials
• envoys
32
41
24
1. Local Government
9 1. Average
Citizens
• Police
2.
separatist
• state
leaders
government
5. religious leaders
1. Civilian
12
21
12
9 1. Human Rights
Establishment
Groups
2. Private Media
• government
3. Experts
officials
• State
Department
• diplomats
13
17
10
1.Diplomats
4 1. Private Media
2. Experts
3. Human Rights
Groups
96
75
171 100

Other Sources
Unofficial sources are more numerous for this group as well, with 13 sources
being quoted 18 times, most notably Private Media (10), especially the British news
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agency, Reuters. Experts were quoted 5 times and Human Rights Groups 3 times.
Diplomats (5) are the most widely quoted other official sources of information for the
second phase of the media coverage of the Kashmir conflict.

Sources used from 1999-2001
In this period, a total of 262 sources were used by the three newspapers in their
coverage of the Kashmir conflict. Of these 262 sources, 99 or 38 percent were Indian, 67
or 25 percent were Pakistani (25%), 31 or 12 percent were from Kashmir, 44 or 17
percent from the U.S. and 21 or 8 percent others. While Indian sources still dominate, the
percentage of Pakistani sources showed a significant increase from the earlier period.
Another noteworthy point is that for the first time both the percentage of Pakistani
sources used and the percentage of U.S. sources used is higher than the percentage of
Kashmiri sources used, as Table 11 illustrates.
Indian Sources
The number of official Indian sources (77) used by the U.S. media was once again
much higher than the number of unofficial Indian sources used (22). Indian Government
(Civilian Establishment) officials were once again the most widely quoted (46 times)
and followed by ministers (36 times) and finally spokespersons (10 times). Among the
ministers, the Prime Minister was quoted 12 times. The Military Establishment (21
times) was the second major official source among the Indians for this phase. Of the 22
unofficial sources, Average Citizens (12) emerged as the most frequently quoted
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followed by Indian Experts and academics (9) and finally, the Indian media (Private
Media) (5).
Table 11: Distribution of Sources in 1999-2001
Affiliation
India

Pakistan

Kashmir

U.S.

Other
Total

Official
No.
1. Civilian
77
Establishment
• officials
• ministers
including
Prime
Minister
• spokespersons
2. Military
Establishment
1. Civilian
46
Establishment
• Pervez
Musharraf
• ministers
• officials
2. Military
Establishment
• Pakistani
Army
1. Political leaders
10
• All Parties
Hurriyat
Conference
1. Civilian
29
Establishment
• officials
• President
• Secret Service
• diplomats
• experts
1. Diplomats

Unofficial
1. Average
Citizens
2. Experts
3. Private Media

No.
Total %
22
99
38

1. Private Media
2. Average
Citizens
3. Experts
4. Guerrillas

21

67

25

1. Average
Citizens
2. Separatists

21

31

12

1. Experts

15

44

17

8
87

21
262

8
100

13
175
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Pakistani Sources
In this period, of the 46 official sources from Pakistan quoted a total of 103 times,
the Civilian Establishment or Pakistani Government sources were the most frequently
quoted, with Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharraf dominating as the largest
single source of information (30). Pakistani ministers were quoted a total of 21 times,
followed by Pakistani officials (20). An official source, the Pakistani Army (Military
Establishment) was quoted a total of 22 times. Of the 21 unofficial Pakistani sources
quoted a total of 27 times in this period, the Pakistani media (Private Media) appeared
10 times, Average Citizens, 7 times, Experts, 6 times and Guerrillas, 4 times.
Kashmiri Sources
Unofficial sources were more than double (21) the number of official sources (10)
for Kashmiris in this phase of the period under study. Average Citizens (20) again
emerged as the most frequently quoted Kashmiris followed by separatists (8). Among the
official sources, Political Leaders constituted by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an
umbrella organization of Kashmiri separatist parties, was quoted a total of 15 times,
followed by leaders at 3 times.
U.S. Sources
A total of 29 official U.S. sources were quoted 81 times in this period with the
U.S. Government or Civilian Establishment remaining the most frequently used source.
Officials were quoted 37 times, the President, 8 times, diplomats, 5 times, and experts, 5
times. The White House (8) and the Secret Service (7) emerged as the other two official
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sources of information. Experts (18) were the most frequently cited unofficial U.S.
sources.
Other Sources
Official sources (13) were more numerous than unofficial sources (8) for this
category. Although diplomats (18) emerged as the most frequently cited sources among
other parties involved in the conflict, there was no clear majority among the unofficial
sources.

Sources used from 2002-2003
A total of 349 sources were used in the fourth and final phase of the coverage of
the Kashmir conflict by The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles
Times. Of these, 126 or 36 percent were Indian, 73 or 21 percent were Pakistani, 68 or 19
percent were Kashmiri, 58 or 16 percent were American and 24 or 7 percent others. Table
12 demonstrates the relative distribution of sources according to their affiliations.
Indian Sources
The number of official Indian sources for the final phase of the 15-year period
under study was 105. The Indian Government or Civilian Establishment was used as a
source of information 143 times, with officials being quoted 80 times; ministers,
including the Prime Minister, 58 times; and spokespersons, only 5 times. Among the
ministers, the defense minister was quoted the highest number of times (28) while the
prime minister was quoted 12 times. Quoted 27 times, the Indian military or Military
Establishment was the second most frequently cited official source of information for
79

the U.S. media. Army spokespersons were quoted 10 times while Indian intelligence
sources emerged as the third most commonly used source (17). Unofficial Indian sources
were only 21 of whom Experts emerged as the ones cited most regularly (16) followed by
the Indian media or Private Media (6) and finally, Average Citizens (6).
Pakistani Sources
A total of 53 official sources were quoted 109 times in this phase, with the
Pakistani Government or Civilian Establishment being the most important source of
information. The Pakistani president was quoted a total of 44 times; officials were quoted
27 times; spokesman, 12 times; and ministers, 9 times. The Pakistani Army or Military
Establishment was quoted only 8 times. Of 20 unofficial sources, the Pakistani media
(National Media) were quoted 12 times, Extremist groups 11 times, Experts, 7 times
and Average Citizens, 5 times.
Kashmiri Sources
Although official sources (20) are less than half the number of unofficial ones
(48), there is an increase in official sources from the previous two periods. The elected
government of Jammu and Kashmir is the most commonly cited official source (18), and
together with the Jammu and Kashmir Police (7) represent the Local Government.
Political Leaders, and specifically the APHC, were quoted 6 times. Of the unofficial
sources, Average Citizens (39) again emerge as the most frequently quoted sources
among the Kashmiri people, followed by Separatist Leaders (19), Human Rights
Groups (13) and Experts (4).
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Table 12: Distribution of Sources in 2002-2003
Aff.
India

Pakistan

Kashmir

U.S.

Other

Total

Official
1. Civilian Establishment
• officials
• ministers
-- Defense Minister
-- Prime Minister
• spokespersons
2. Military Establishment
• spokespersons
• intelligence
1. Civilian Establishment
• Pervez Musharraf
• officials
• spokesman
• ministers
2. Military Establishment
• Pakistani Army
1. Local Government
• state government
• Police
2. Political Leaders
• All Parties
Hurriyat
Conference
1. Civilian Establishment
• Secretary of State
• Officials
• Deputy Secretary
of State
• diplomats
• President
2. Military Establishment
1. diplomats

No.
Unofficial
105 1. Experts
2. Private
Media
3. Average
Citizens

No.
Total %
21
126
36

53 1. Private
Media
2. Extremist
Groups
3. Experts
4. Average
Citizens

20

73

21

20 1. Average
Citizens
2. Separatist
leaders
3. Human
Rights Groups
4. Experts
50 1. Private
Media
2. Experts

48

68

19

8

58

17

14 1. Private
Media
• Reuters
242

10

24

7

107

349

100
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U.S. Sources
The number of official sources (50) for the fourth period is overwhelmingly
higher for the U.S. than the number of unofficial sources (8). Representatives of the U.S.
Government or Civilian Establishment are quoted a total of 113 times with the two most
frequently quoted sources being the Secretary of State Colin Powell (27) and officials
(27) signifying high-profile U.S. involvement in the region in the final phase of the
period under study. While the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was quoted 17
times, diplomats were quoted 8 times and the president was quoted 6 times. The U.S.
military was the second most commonly used American official source but was only
quoted 14 times. Among unofficial sources, the Private Media were quoted 4 times and
Experts, 3 times.
Other Sources
Diplomats were the most commonly used official sources of information (16)
whereas Private Media (11), especially the Reuters News Agency were the most
frequently cited source among unofficial sources.
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Chapter 5
Discussion

The preceding chapter identified the frames that the U.S. media, represented by
The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have used in their
coverage of the Kashmir conflict and the parties involved in it. It also listed the sources –
official and unofficial – that have been used to cover the events in Kashmir and also their
relative distribution among the various parties in the conflict. This chapter discusses the
changes that have occurred in the frames reported in the previous chapter over the 15year period stretching from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 2003. It also describes the
frames that have had an overwhelming presence in this coverage and the major sources
the three media have cited in their coverage. In addition, it seeks to explain these
conclusions by relating them to the events occurring in Kashmir, in the Indian
subcontinent and in the world. Finally, this chapter provides the implications of this
study’s findings and conclusions on future mass media research.

Changing Frames
In order to answer the first research question, which was whether and how frames
used in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict and parties to it have changed in the 15-year
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period of study, the study compared the relative prominence of major and minor frames
in the coverage of each “subject” over the four phases into which the entire period was
divided. The results of the comparison, detailed in the following paragraphs, suggest that
the frames indeed have changed throughout the period of coverage under study and the
changes seem to be related to local, regional and global developments.

Coverage of the Conflict
In the first two periods of its coverage, spanning from 1989 to 1998, the conflict
in Kashmir is framed as a movement in which the citizenry is portrayed as rising in revolt
against a ruling power and trying to separate itself from that power. This is conveyed by
the prominence of the Internal Revolt frame among nouns, the Mass-based Action
frame among the modifiers and the Growing Unrest frame among verbs. In the last two
periods of the coverage, stretching over 1999 till the end of 2003, the frame that emerges
is that of an ongoing conflict in which the concerned parties are engaged in physical
violence against each other. This is conveyed through the use of words that form the
Physical Violence and Conflict frame for nouns, the Long and Dangerous Conflict for
the modifiers and once again Growing Unrest for the verbs. A glance at Table 3 shows
the frames that dominate the last two phases were minor in the first two phases whereas
the frames that were major in the first two phases, conveying the goal of the Kashmiri
movement – freedom or separation from India – are relegated to the background in the
last two phases.
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Table 13: Dominant Frames for the conflict
Period
1989-1990
1991-1998
1999-2001
2002-2003
1989-2003

Dominant Frames
Mass-based Action, Growing Unrest
Internal Revolt, Mass-based Action, Growing Unrest
Physical Violence, Conflict, Long & Dangerous Conflict, Growing
Unrest
Outside Interference, Physical Violence, Conflict, Disagreement,
Long and Dangerous Conflict
Warfare

The last two phases also show the emergence of the Terrorism, Outside
Interference, Religious Identity and Disagreement frames. Together with the focus on
ongoing violence in the last two phases, these frames convey the idea that the conflict,
engendered by a dispute over the region between India and Pakistan, was increasingly
driven by people from outside Kashmir who had a strong Islamic identity and who were
carrying out activities that could be labeled terrorist.

Coverage of the Region
In the first two phases, the Kashmir region is identified as a Political Entity – as
a state within the Indian union – a description that takes the backseat in the last two
phases. In the first two phases, the goal of the armed movement in Kashmir – separation
from India – is evident and therefore it follows that Kashmir is referred to as a part of
what its people want to break away from. Complementing the greater focus on the
ongoing violence and the labeling of the Kashmir issue as more of a dispute between
India and Pakistan and less of a separatist movement in the last two phases, Kashmir is
identified more by the Geographic Entity and Disagreement frames. However, in all
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phases, Religious Identity remains a prominent frame signifying that an emphasis was
placed on the fact that Kashmir was a Muslim region and therefore different from the rest
of India that in general the reports described as Hindu.
Table 14: Dominant Frames for the region
Period
1989-1990
1991-1998
1999-2001
2002-2003
1989-2003

Dominant Frames
Political Entity, Geographic Entity, Religious Identity
Geographic Entity, Political Entity, Religious Identity, Disagreement
Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Religious Identity
Geographic Entity, Disagreement, Religious Identity, Political Entity
Religious Identity

Coverage of Kashmir and Kashmiris
In all four phases of coverage, the frames for Kashmiris remain largely the same –
militants and guerrillas (Armed Combatants) belonging to Islamic groups (Religious
Identity and Organized Activity) fighting through violent means (Violent Protester) to
separate Kashmir from India (Mass-based Action, Separatist Rebels and Internal
Revolt). The only changes that occur are in the relative prominence of the Ordinary
Kashmiris frame in the four phases of coverage. In the first phase, the ordinary people of
Kashmir protesting through non-violent means have a high presence in the coverage. In
the second and third phases, they are relegated to the sidelines by the activities of the
armed militants who killed, massacred, bombed and kidnapped their way into a greater
presence in the media. Ironically, the reasons they cited for committing these violent
activities was to draw greater international attention to their struggle to break away from
India (Schofield, 2003). The Ordinary Kashmiris frame makes a comeback in the fourth
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phase along with Civilian Government frame indicating the start of a political process in
Kashmir after elections in and formation of a new state legislature.
Table 15: Dominant Frames for Kashmir and Kashmiris
Period
1989-1990
1991-1998
1999-2001
2002-2003
1989-2003

Dominant Frames
Armed Combatant, Ordinary Kashmiris, Mass-based Action,
Violent Protester, Non-violent protester
Armed Combatant, Separatist Rebels, Organized Activity,
Internal Revolt, Violent Protester, Non-violent protester
Organized Activity, Armed Combatant, Mass-based Action,
Violent Protester, Non-violent protester
Armed Combatant, Civilian Establishment, Ordinary Kashmiris,
Violent Protester, Non-violent protester
Religious Identity

Coverage of India and Indians
In the first two phases of the conflict, the frames used for India portray it as a
nation using its Military Establishment to crush the separatist movement of the people
of Kashmir (Violent Repressor). These two frames, combined with the dominant frames
for the conflict describing it as a separatist movement and the Kashmiris identifying them
as armed militants fighting for freedom from India in the first two phases, create the
master frame of a violent confrontation between the government and armed forces of
India and the people of Kashmir.
However, this frame is displaced in the last two phases, with the emphasis shifting
from the people of Kashmir to the Pakistanis as the chief opponents of India. In the third
and fourth phases, India emerges as a nuclear-armed country (Nuclear Risk frame)
fighting (Continuing Warfare frame) its nuclear-armed opponent, Pakistan, in Kashmir,
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which is a region of dispute between them (Disagreement frame), through its armed
forces (Military Establishment). Demonstrating this shift in focus from the people of
Kashmir to Pakistan as the main Indian adversary is the decline of the Violent Repressor
and Law and Order Maintainer frames for India. Through all four phases, the government
of India (Civilian Establishment) continues to present its case in the diplomatic arena
(Diplomatic Entity, Conciliatory Posturing, and Aggressive Posturing) but its military
activities are highlighted more than its diplomatic activities, perhaps because of the
constant presence of the Indian military and paramilitary units in the Kashmir region.
Table 16: Dominant Frames for India and Indians
Period
1989-1990
1991-1998
1999-2001

2002-2003

1989-2003

Dominant Frames
Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Violent Repressor,
Law & Order Maintainer
Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Violent Repressor,
Law & Order Maintainer
Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk,
Diplomatic Entity – Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing,
Continuing Warfare
Military Establishment, Civilian Establishment, Nuclear Risk,
Diplomatic Entity – Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing,
Continuing Warfare
Religious Identity

The portrayal of India as a nuclear-armed nation coupled with an emphasis on its
ongoing violent conflict with Pakistan as well as the emergence of Nuclear Risk as one
of the minor frames for the conflict in phases three and four, point to an attempt to frame
the conflict and region as a nuclear time bomb, a reiteration of the opinion held and
expressed frequently by Western governments and international relations experts. An
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example of the reportage following the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in
May 1998 is as follows (Burns, 1998, p.1):
In May, the stakes in the conflict rose immeasurably when first India and then
Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear powers.
The tests raised worldwide alarm, with President Clinton and other leaders
appealing to India and Pakistan to settle their differences over Kashmir to prevent
the territory from becoming the flashpoint of a nuclear war.

Coverage of Pakistan and Pakistanis
As was the case with India, the entire period of coverage has four recurring
frames for Pakistan: the Civilian Establishment of Pakistan engaged in the activities of a
Diplomatic Entity including both Conciliatory and Aggressive Posturing, a Military
Establishment that is a Violent Neighbor to India and a country that is an Active
Supporter of the Kashmiri separatist movement. Coinciding with the greater depiction of
the events in Kashmir as a separatist rebellion waged by armed militants in the first two
phases, Pakistan is described more as aiding that struggle with arms, training and money
than as involved in a military direct dispute with India. However, as the narrative shifts
to the characterization of the conflict as ongoing violence in the last two phases, Pakistan
is increasingly framed as an active participant and not just a supporter.
Introduction of the Outside Interference frame and increase in the prominence of
the Violent Neighbor frame in the third phase as well as greater focus on Military
Establishment frame and the entry of the Militant Extremists frame in the fourth phase,
bring Pakistan’s direct involvement to the fore in the last two phases. Reinforcing the
greater recognition on the part of the United States and also on the part of the media of
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Pakistan as home to several militant Islamic organizations that were engaged in terrorist
activities, is the presence of the Cracking Down frame in the fourth phase.
Table 17: Dominant Frames for Pakistan and Pakistanis
Period
1989-1990
1991-1998
1999-2001
2002-2003
1989-2003

Dominant Frames
Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Active Supporter,
Diplomatic Entity
Civilian Establishment, Active Supporter, Diplomatic Entity, Violent
Neighbor
Civilian Establishment, Military Establishment, Conciliatory
Posturing, Violent Neighbor, Active Supporter
Military Establishment, Militant Extremists, Nuclear Risk, Cracking
Down, Conciliatory Posturing
Religious Identity

A point to note here from the journalistic practices standpoint is that the actions
that the different subjects are engaged in and the changes in these actions are more
strongly conveyed through the verbs used for them as compared to adjectives and nouns.
This might be because journalists paint a more colorful picture through the verbs they use
to describe an action done by any actor in the story than through nouns because verbs can
be used with greater variety and accuracy in the painting of a picture.

Coverage of the United States and Others
The Americans do not have a very high profile in the first two phases and come
across as Concerned Advisors in the last two phases engaged in diplomatic parleys with
India and Pakistan. As far as “Other” parties are concerned, the increased presence of
human rights groups (Human Rights Concerns and Critical Observer) in the second
phase complements the Kashmiris separatists fighting the militarily repressive Indian
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government frame that characterized the conflict in the first two phases. At that time,
international human rights organizations accused the Indian government of committing
human rights violations against Kashmiri civilians. In the third and fourth phases,
reinforcing the growing participation of outsiders (Outside Interference) and Pakistanis
(Militant Extremists and Violent Neighbor) in the ongoing violence in Kashmir is the
presence of the Foreign Soldiers frame. The media coverage highlights fighters from
outside Kashmir with a strong Religious Identity fighting to separate Kashmir from
India (Separatist Rebels frame).
Table 18: Dominant Frames for Other Parties
Period
1989-1990
1991-1998
1999-2001
2002-2003

Dominant Frames
News media
Human Rights Concerns, Concerned Advisor, Critical Observer
Foreign Soldiers, Religious Identity, Outside Interference, Violent
Outsiders
Foreign Soldiers, Concerned Advisor

Dominant frames
In answer to the second research question, which was what have been the
dominant frames in the U.S. media coverage of the Kashmir and to what extent have
these frames reflected such major themes as religion, armed conflict, U.S. national
interest, and threat to world peace, this study found that the two frames that have been
present throughout the 15-year period investigated, have been the Warfare frame for the
conflict reflecting the theme of armed conflict and the Religious Identity frame for the
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Indians, the Pakistanis and the Kashmir region and the Kashmiris reflecting the religion
theme.
The Warfare frame has been constructed from only the word “war” and since it
emerged as the most prominent frame in three of the four phases into which the period of
study was divided, it follows that the U.S. media have placed a great emphasis in
highlighting the Kashmir conflict sometimes as a “guerrilla” or “separatist war” but
mostly as a conflict that has sparked wars in the past between India and Pakistan and has
the potential of turning into a “wider war” or even a “nuclear war.”
This frame emerged as a dominant because in almost every news report on
Kashmir, there is a standard or “boiler plate” description of the events that have taken
place in the subcontinent since 1947, when India and Pakistan became separate nations,
independent of the departing British colonial power. Following is a typical description of
the nature of relations between India and Pakistan (Burns, 1994, p.6A):
…none deny that a new war, if it began, would almost certainly center on
Kashmir.
In two of the three wars the two countries have fought since Britain's departing
colonial rulers partitioned the Indian subcontinent in 1947, creating Hindudominated India and Muslim-ruled Pakistan, Kashmir has been the battleground.
“No issue between them so focuses the passions -- of religion, of nationalism, and
of pride -- that have made each, for the other, an object of enduring dislike and
mistrust.

Due in large part to this recurring description of the two nations’ historical
conflict over Kashmir, the Warfare frame emerges as dominant. These narratives tie in
directly to the rules of journalistic writing that entail a recounting of the background in
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order to place the events in context for the reader. This is particularly true of events and
issues that are covered sporadically or are far removed from the reader’s experience as
the Kashmir conflict undoubtedly is for an American audience.
The second dominant frame that emerges from an overview of the entire period
analyzed in this research is the Religious Identity frame used to describe the conflict, the
region and the three parties involved – Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Whereas India
has been described as a “Hindu” or a “predominantly Hindu” country, Kashmir has been
described as a Muslim or “Muslim dominated” region, and Kashmiris as “majority
Muslim and Pakistan as an “Islamic” or “Muslim” country.
Since the turn of the year, and especially in the last two weeks, the Kashmir
Valley, a Muslim region seeking independence from predominantly Hindu India, has
been engulfed by a storm of violence. (Gargan, 1993, p1)
Kashmir, a territory about the size of Utah with a population whose majority is
Muslim, is wedged between India, Pakistan and China. Its ownership has been disputed
between predominantly Muslim Pakistan and largely Hindu India since both gained
independence in 1947. The two nations -- the world's newest nuclear powers -- have
fought two of their three wars over Kashmir. (Bearak, 2000, p8A)
Although it is a fact that Pakistan was founded as a homeland for the Muslims of
South Asia, India was established as a secular democracy where religion is a private and
the Indian Constitution guarantees ever citizen the right to practice and preach his or her
faith. In the past 15 years, there has been a rise in Hindu fundamentalist forces on the
national scene in India, but India’s refusal to let go of Kashmir is rooted in its secular
identity (Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002). According to Cohen (2003), India “finds it difficult
to turn over a Muslim majority region to a Muslim neighbor just because it is Muslim”
(p. 46, emphasis in original). However, the constant juxtaposition of the three parties and
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their religious majorities seems to convey the impression that the demographics of India
have a major influence on India’s attitude towards the dispute and the nature of its
policies in Kashmir. However, it can be argued that describing Pakistan as a Muslim
country and its claim to the territory of Kashmir as rooted in religion is justifiable since
the country was founded as an Islamic nation and because it considers Kashmir as
legitimately a part of Pakistan because the population in Kashmir is mainly Muslim
(Cohen, 2003, Dixit, 2002, Schofield, 2003).
The identification of the parties by their religion might be related again to the
need for explaining in a simple manner a complex situation playing out in part of the
world that for most American readers would arguably be remote. The assigning of
religious motivation to the actions of the parties concerned may be the result of an
attempt to provide a simple explanation to a very nuanced and multi-layered conflict that
has persisted through five and half decades.
Threat to U.S. national interests is reflected in the great attention paid to the
conflict in the last phase (2002-2003) as reflected by the quantum leap in coverage of the
Kashmir conflict and the tensions between India and Pakistan in all three newspapers
from 2001 to 2002 (see Table 1). At that time, the U.S. was actively pressuring Pakistan
to ban extremist Islamic groups based in Pakistan because after the events on September
11, 2001, these groups were seen as a threat to the security of Americans. This concern is
also reflected in the high prominence of the Cracking Down frame among verbs used for
Pakistanis in the last phase of the coverage. The increase in coverage was also related to
the greater prominence of the frames reflecting a violent conflict in the latter two periods
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(Long and Dangerous Conflict, Conflict, Physical Violence and Outside
Interference) as opposed to a separatist movement because there was a massive military
standoff between India and Pakistan in summer 2002 and coupled with the fears
expressed about the possibility of a nuclear exchange, there is a clear presence of the
threat to word peace theme in the frames.

Sources
Past research has shown that the media tend to rely on official sources for
information. In her content analysis of the The New York Times and The Washington
Post, Dickson (1992) found that the two elite newspapers relied heavily on U.S.
government officials for information on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. One reason
is that official sources are more easily accessible to journalists and this greater
accessibility makes the job of news gathering more efficient. Another is that these
sources are perceived to be more authoritative, with the information they provide
considered to be factually accurate (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991; Entman, 1989;
Dickson, 1992).
Analysis of sources for the 15-year period of coverage of the Kashmir conflict
reveals the same disproportionate reliance on official sources as compared to unofficial
ones. In the 1989-1990 phase, the Civilian Establishments of India, Pakistan and the
United States were quoted more than three times as often as their unofficial counterparts.
In fact for Pakistan, this ratio was 12 to 1. This finding is in accordance with past
research that suggests the greater reliance of news media on official, especially
95

government, sources. Among unofficial sources for these three countries, the Private
Media were the most often cited source; this is not surprising, considering that these
three nations have well developed press systems. Also, media organizations act as
sources for each other and especially when covering a foreign country, journalists pay
close attention to the domestic media, often picking up leads from them and then
featuring their information in, or following this information up in their own stories.
Only in the case of the Kashmiris is this trend reversed with a greater presence of
unofficial sources, especially Average Citizens, in all fours phases of the coverage.
Separatist and religious leaders have been the two other main groups of unofficial
Kashmiri sources that have been cited in more than two phases of coverage. All three
newspapers in this study were found to have carried extensive quotes from the ordinary
people of Kashmir in many news-based analytical stories. For example:
''They have made every Muslim a suspect,'' a businessman said of the Indian
armed forces' attempts to subdue a fast-growing independence movement. ''We
are all militants now.'' (Crossette, 1990, p. 1 A)
"We have bullets from the left and bullets from the right, bullets from in front and
bullets from behind," said an elderly Muslim cloth trader in Lal Chowk, a bazaar
here. He whispered, "Everything we valued has been destroyed." (Burns, 1995, p.
3)

In the second phase, reflecting a growing concern with accusations of human
rights violations made against India, Human Rights Groups feature prominently among
unofficial sources, which are incidentally higher in number than official sources for the
United Stats and the “Other” parties. India and Pakistan, however, continue to be
represented by their respective Civilian Establishments. As compared to Indians and the
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people of Kashmir, Pakistan and the United States maintain a low profile in the first two
phases, an indication that the conflict at this time was mainly an Internal Revolt that
India was trying to suppress by violent means (Violent Repressor).
In the third and the fourth phases, the profile of both Pakistan and the United
States is higher than in the first two phases. In fact, Pakistani sources exceed in number
even sources from Kashmir, with Pakistani Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf
heading the list of Civilian Establishment sources from Pakistan. This seems to signify
the greater concentration of power and authority in him, the central figure and face of
Pakistan to the world community after 1999. In contrast, India continued to be
represented heavily through its Civilian Establishment officials and elected
representatives including the Prime Minister and his cabinet of ministers in the third and
fourth phases.
Reflecting growing U.S. concern with the nuclear-armed status of India and
Pakistan from 1999 to 2001 (Nuclear Risk) and its interest then in roping in Pakistan to
hunt down Al Qaeda, the Civilian Establishment sources used from the United States
become increasingly high-profile in the third and fourth phases of the media coverage of
the Kashmir conflict. In fact, Secretary of State Colin Powell is the most frequently cited
U.S. source from 2002 to 2003 implying the intense U.S. involvement in the South Asian
region in the last phase.
In the final two phases, although the people of Kashmir still were represented by
unofficial sources, mainly Average Citizens and Separatist Leaders, whose number
was twice the number of official sources, there was a move towards quoting more official
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Kashmiri sources, particularly officials of the elected Local Government and Political
Leaders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of Kashmiri
separatist political parties, signifying the start of a political process in Kashmir. Kashmiri
human rights groups and experts also emerged as other unofficial sources indicating a
greater consolidation of the Non-violent Protesters in Kashmir than in the past.
Therefore, in answer to the third research question, which was what have been the
nature and affiliation of sources in the coverage of the Kashmir conflict, this study found
that among official sources, Indian sources were the most frequently quoted followed by
sources from Pakistan, the United States, Kashmir and “Other” parties. Among unofficial
sources, those from Kashmir were the most frequently cited followed by those from
India, Pakistan, the United States and finally, the “Other” parties.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions

This study has discovered and analyzed the frames through which the U.S. print
media have reported on the Kashmir conflict. As discussed in the literature review section
of this thesis, media construct social reality through the frames that they use. They
construct these frames by singling out some features of subjects, developments or their
environments, and emphasizing these features over others. In the case of their coverage
of the Kashmir conflict, the U.S. print media, represented by The New York Times, The
Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, have chosen to highlight two aspects of the
Kashmir conflict – religion and warfare.
Through their consistent use of religious descriptors for India, Pakistan and
Kashmir, they have created a simplified version of the complex reality of the region – the
desires of its people and the reasons for the tussle between India and Pakistan. The
political reasons for the Kashmiri separatist movement – discontentment with corrupt
regional governments, lack of adequate civic amenities and industrial development,
unemployment, disillusionment with the electoral system, and anger at being
shortchanged out of their semi-autonomous status in the Indian union – were never
highlighted. Instead, the media chose the easy way out by labeling the conflict as
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religious in nature, possibly because conflict over religion resonates with current
American cultural frames. It can be argued that with Islam being considered a major
threat to Western countries especially after the events on September 11, 2001, the U.S.
media might increasingly resort to this kind of religious framing, particularly in cases
where one of the parties involved subscribes to Islam.
The second aspect of the reality constructed by the U.S. print media is that of a
conflict that essentially is a war and can turn into a larger war or a nuclear war. While
this frame does reflect the nature of the developments on the ground that were, it ties into
two characteristics of U.S. media coverage of events in foreign counties. First, it confirms
what previous studies have found – that U.S. media coverage of third world countries
tends to be crisis-oriented defined as dissent, war, terrorism, crime, coups, assassinations
or disasters (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). The pattern visible in the coverage of the
Kashmir conflict also reflects this tendency. When the separatist movement started in
1989, since there were mass demonstrations, mass killings, kidnappings and bombings,
the conflict attracted a lot of U.S. media attention in one year from December 1989 to
December 1990 (40 stories in The New York Times and 15 in The Washington Post). The
coverage lagged in the eight-year period from 1991 to 1998 (33 stories in The New York
Times and only 3 stories each in The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times)
because there were violent events happening in areas of the world that were of greater
importance to the United States and consequently to its media – the crisis in the Middle
east, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and later Kosovo – although killings, kidnappings and
bombings continued unabated in Kashmir (Schofield, 2003).
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When India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in 1998, nuclear-capable
Western nations, including the United States, started expressing fears that there might be
a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, in spite of the fact that India committed itself
publicly to no first use of nuclear weapons. Despite repeated reiterations by Indian and
Pakistani officials that neither country could afford a nuclear war and that the weapons
actually decreased the possibility of even a conventional war and were mere deterrents,
the U.S. media continued to quote U.S. and other Western government officials,
including former President Bill Clinton and diplomats and experts, as saying that the
Kashmir was a nuclear flashpoint. This reflects the imprint of power in media frames,
with the United States emerging the clear winner in the framing of the Kashmir conflict
by the U.S. media. The priorities and concerns of the United State were clearly reflected
in the warfare frame that was employed throughout the period analyzed in this study, a
fact that leads to the conclusion that the media in the U.S. reflect the agenda of the
government when it comes to international relations.
Entamn (1989) has said that media frame the issues they cover not only by
choosing to include certain aspects of reality but also by choosing to exclude some
aspects, and that is clearly what the U.S. media have done regarding the Kashmir conflict
by not including or emphasizing certain opinions and contentions. They have chosen to
look at the conflict through the straitjacket of the U.S. government’s stance on the region
and supplemented this stand by quotes from U.S. experts on this issue. They have not
promoted to an equal extent the contentions of the Indian and Pakistani governments that
the possibility of nuclear war between them is remote. Tying this analysis of the content
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of U.S. media frames back to the initial argument that only crisis and bloodshed and
possibility of a greater conflict in Third World countries get covered in the U.S. media,
the number of stories in The New York Times jumped from 4 in 1998 to 24 in 1999, the
year in which India and Pakistan fought their undeclared war in Kargil in Kashmir. The
coverage again jumped from 2001 to 2002, when India and Pakistan massed nearly a
million troops along the Line of Control in Kashmir (6 to 21 in The Washington Post, 5 to
24 in the Los Angeles Times and 15 to 51 in The New York Times) reflecting once again
that the possibility of violence on a larger and potentially catastrophic scale ensures
coverage by the U.S. media. Another reason for the hike in coverage from 2001 to 2002
was the growing involvement of the United States in the region through the George Bush
administration’s aggressive attempts to include Pakistan in its coalition against terrorism
and the Afghanistan war, clearly reflecting increased media coverage due to increased
U.S. interest in the region.
A shift that clearly demonstrated the influence of changing U.S.-India and U.S.Pakistan relations from 1989 to 2003 was the move towards greater recognition of
Pakistan’s role in actively aiding the militants in Kashmir in terrorist activities, as a fact
and not just an Indian allegation. The coverage which criticized the Indian government
for its alleged human rights violations and labeled Indian allegations that Pakistan was
training and arming Kashmiri militants as claims in the first two periods, changes to
being critical of Pakistan for harboring Islamic terrorist organizations that committed
violent acts in Kashmir. This shift can be attributed to the increasing closeness between
the United States and India and to the U.S. government’s concern with American
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security, once again reflecting the impact of power on media frames. In conclusion, one
can say that the U.S. media have constructed the reality of the Kashmir conflict by
making selected attributes of the conflict salient and by highlighting in their text, problem
definitions and causal interpretations advanced by the U.S. government. Also, confirming
past findings on international news coverage by the U.S. media, this study shows that
media coverage of the Kashmir conflict was crisis-oriented and reflected U.S. concerns in
the region.

Implications for Future Research
Media theorists, particularly Entman (1989, Gamson (1989) and Graber (1988),
have conceptualized frames as being present in the communicator, the text, the audience
and the culture, with the presence of frames in any one of these locations influencing
their presence in another. Although this study did not look at the frames for the Kashmir
conflict among the communicators, the audience and the culture, they no doubt had a
great influence on the frames evident in the text.
The events in Kashmir were definitely covered because they were newsworthy
from the perspective of the news value of “conflict,” which is arguably the news value on
which the media place a great premium and which determines most, if not all, news
content. Frames that reflected journalistic practices and socialization were once again the
religion and warfare frames, both signifying an attempt to simplify reality and structure it
in an inverted pyramid fashion, the need to provide superficial historical background and
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boiler-plate descriptions to place the events in context for their readers, and also the
media acceptance of the government “line” when it comes to foreign news coverage.
Researchers have found that the mass media have priming effects, in that the
repeated exposure of audiences to ideas and information in the media triggers related
ideas and feelings in their minds. Salwen and Matera (1992) found distinct evidence of
the second level agenda setting influence of the mass media in public perception of
several foreign countries as dangerous places and as friends or enemies, which persisted
even though media coverage of those nations had started changing, providing evidence of
the enduring impact of repeated frames on the audience’s thinking about issues, or in this
case, foreign countries. Drawing from their findings, one can argue that since the
dominant frames that have characterized the conflict have been religion, with one of them
being Islam, and warfare, the readers of the three newspapers in this study would
undoubtedly perceive the Kashmir conflict as a potentially disastrous war involving
parties that subscribe to different religions. Viewed in the context of the Middle East
crisis between Palestinian Muslims and Israeli Jews as well as terrorist acts perpetrated
by Islamic extremists in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Chechnya and Sudan, this might
also add to the increasing demonization of Islam in America as a religion that perpetuates
violence.
The current study therefore could serve as a starting point for a second-level
agenda setting study aimed at determining such issues as a) the perceptions of Americans
regarding the Kashmir conflict; b) the level of correspondence of these audience frames
with the mass media frames discovered in this study; and c) the persistence of these
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media and audience frames. Such a study would add to the body of work about
international news reporting and framing of international news as well as to the existing
research on effects of frames present in media text on the audience.
This emphasis on religion and warfare as the primary frames for the Kashmir
conflict can also be tied to certain characteristics of American culture, the fourth location
of frames identified by Entman (1989). American society has been found to be highly
ethnocentric, and this tendency of Americans to concern themselves mainly with their
domestic affairs is reflected in the low and essentially crisis-driven coverage given to
international affairs and particularly events in Third World countries by the U.S. media.
High ethnocentrism also breeds ignorance of other cultures and imposition of American
interpretations on complex, multi-layered events occurring in other countries. These
interpretations are evident in the media text and are maybe brought about by the
journalists and imbibed by the audience, making it a somewhat cyclical process.
Therefore, another area of research for which this study could serve as a base is an
investigation into the frames regarding foreign countries – especially such South Asian
countries as India and Pakistan – that are present in the American culture and how these
might impact the frames communicated by journalists who cover events in these
countries, editors who edit their reports, or the gatekeepers who select these reports for
presentation to the public. A basic tenet of journalism is that its practitioners engage in
writing for the perhaps rather specific audience of a particular mass medium. It follows
that certain perceptions in the minds of reporters about what American readers would
want to read might influence frames that these reporters would use in their coverage of
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these countries. One major focus of future study could be the determination of the degree
to which the knowledge of cultural and audience characteristics had an influence on the
frames the reporters, editors, or gatekeepers presented in the stories on which this study
focused.
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Appendix A: Coding Sheet
Date:______________________

Newspaper:______________________

Dateline:______________________________________
Headline:________________________________________________________
Sources:
Type: Official=1, Unofficial=2
Official: Military, Diplomatic, Government, Political parties
Unofficial: Non-governmental, human rights groups, militant groups, religious
organizations, journalists, laypersons, media
Affiliation: Indian=1, Pakistani=2, Kashmiri=3, U.S.=4, Other=5
Name

Position

Organization

Type Aff.

No.

Keywords:
Type: Noun=1, Verbs=2, Adjectives=3, Adverbs=4
Subject: Dispute=1, Region=2, Indians=3, Pakistanis=4, Kashmiris=5, U.S.=6, Other=7
No.= Number of times the word appears in the article
Word

Type Sub No.

Modifier
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Type Sub

No.

